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Abstract
Transportation Economics the use of economic models and theory to further eﬃcient
transportation  has become highly relevant in today's congested world. This PhD-thesis
contributes to the ﬁeld of Transportation Economics by focusing on the eﬃcient use of
traﬃc lights (Part I) and on the implementation of eﬃcient transportation policies (Part
II). Central to the ﬁrst part of this thesis is the regulation of intersections. In particular,
three issues on this subject are analyzed: Part I begins by studying the optimal regulation
of intersections, where the intersection can be regulated by traﬃc lights or a priority rule,
and tolls can be levied. Next, Part I compares the eﬃciency of traﬃc-responsive signal
control and anticipatory signal control. Part I ends by analyzing whether traﬃc lights can
achieve the same results as tolls. Part II of this thesis focuses on a case study of eﬃcient
transportation policies and more particularly on the eﬀectiveness and welfare eﬀects of
alternative transport policies designed to reduce urban traﬃc externalities in a medium
sized city.
v
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Samenvatting
Door de toenemende congestie is de studie van transporteconomie - het gebruik van econo-
mische theorie en modellen om eﬃciënte mobiliteit te bevorderen - vandaag de dag uiterst
relevant. Deze thesis in transporteconomie focust op het eﬃciënt gebruik van verkeerslich-
ten (Deel I) en op de toepassing van eﬃciente transportmaatregelen (Deel II). In het eerste
gedeelte van deze thesis staat de regulering van kruispunten centraal. Drie aspecten wor-
den er geanalyseerd: Als eerste wordt de optimale regulering van kruispunten bestudeerd.
Het kruispunt kan hierbij zowel door een voorrangsregel als door verkeerlichten geregeld
worden. Ook kan er een tolheﬃng van toepassing zijn. Ten tweede wordt de eﬃciëntie van
een proactieve verkeerslichtinstelling afgewogen tegen de eﬃciëntie van een reactieve ver-
keerslichtinstelling. En ten slotte wordt er nagegaan of verkeerslichten dezelfde resultaten
kunnen behalen als een tolheﬃng. In het tweede gedeelte van deze thesis ligt de nadruk
op een case-study omtrent eﬃciënt transportbeleid. In dit gedeelte wordt met name inge-
gaan op de doeltreﬀendheid en welvaartseﬀecten van transportmaatregelen, bedoeld om de
externe kosten van vervoer te reduceren in een middelgrote stad.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In many areas, a steadily increasing demand for mobility is confronting economic, social and
physical constraints on transportation infrastructure. One way to meet with this increasing
demand is by building new infrastructure. A more cost-eﬀective way however would be
to make better use of the existing infrastructure. In its recent Green Paper the European
Commission emphasizes that to limit congestion in certain cases new infrastructure might
be needed, but the ﬁrst step should be to explore how to make better use of existing in-
frastructure (European Commission (2007)).
Intersections are an important component of the traﬃc network. Nielsen et al. (1998)
states that intersection delays account for 17 − 35% of the total travel time in the Mu-
nicipality of Copenhagen. Arnott (1990) indicates that the principal form of congestion
in C.B.D. auto travel is signalized intersection congestion. The National Transportation
Operations Coalition (NTOC) declares that delays at traﬃc signals constitute 5-10% of all
traﬃc delay (NTOC (2012)). The regulation of these intersections consequently has a large
impact on the eﬃciency of the network as a whole.
Intersections can be regulated by traﬃc lights or a priority rule, or they can be con-
trolled by a roundabout. Kakooza et al. (2005) found that with light traﬃc, roundabouts
perform better than un-signalized and signalized intersections in terms of easing congestion,
but with heavy traﬃc, signalized intersection perform better. In this thesis we will only
focus on unsignalized and signalized intersections.
In 1868, the ﬁrst gas-lit traﬃc lights were installed outside the Houses of Parliament in
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London to control the traﬃc in Bridge Street, Great George Street and Parliament Street.
The ﬁrst electric traﬃc light was installed on the corner of East 105th Street and Euclid
Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio in 1914 (Wikipedia contributors (2015)). Roughly ﬁfty years
later, the ﬁrst signal control model was studied by Webster (1958). This model assumed
traﬃc ﬂows to be unaﬀected by the signal settings. In reality, however, traﬃc ﬂows will
react to a changes signal settings. And these modiﬁed traﬃc ﬂows subsequently require
signal settings to be re-optimized.
The second generation of signal control, traﬃc-responsive control (Miller (1963)), takes into
account this mutual dependence of traﬃc ﬂow and signal settings. In traﬃc-responsive con-
trol, data collected from vehicle detectors located upstream is used to optimize the signal
settings. Successful commercial products of this sort are the Split Cycle Oﬀset Optimisa-
tion Technique (SCOOT, Hunt et al. (1981)) and the Sydney Coordinated Adaptive Traﬃc
System (SCATS, Luk (1984)).
The strand in the literature that deals with traﬃc-responsive signal control focuses
on the iterative optimization and assignment procedure. In the iterative optimization and
assignment procedure the signal settings and equilibrium ﬂow patterns are updated alter-
natively, until both ﬂows are at equilibrium and signal settings are optimal given the ﬂows
(Allsop and Charlesworth (1977), Cantarella et al. (1991), Gartner et al. (1980), Lee and
Hazelton (1996)).
Another approach that takes into account the interaction between traﬃc control and
traﬃc assignment is known as anticipatory control. In the literature, this has been formu-
lated as a bi-level problem, in which the upper level is the signal setting problem and the
lower level is the traﬃc equilibrium assignment problem (Chiou (1999), Yang and Yagar
(1995)), and as a Stackelberg game (Fisk (1984)).
Although traﬃc signal control has been the subject of numerous studies, it is widely
accepted that traﬃc signal beneﬁts are not fully realized and there is plenty of room for
improvement (Lo (1999)). In the second chapter of this thesis, we therefore take a fresh
look at the optimization of intersections.
To acquire maximum insight and understanding of the optimization problem, we fo-
cus on a simple two-road network, which allows us to obtain an optimal solution. More
speciﬁcally, we optimize the regulation of an intersection of two routes connecting one
2
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origin-destination pair. This network was also used by Smith (1979b) to maximize capac-
ity. The simpliﬁed network can represent two parallel roads (e.g. a road through an urban
area and a parallel road bypassing the city) or two parallel modes (e.g. a train and a road
connecting two cities).
We follow Fisk (1984) in modelling the combined assignment and control problem as
a Stackelberg game. In this game the leader (traﬃc authority) moves ﬁrst and bases his
decision on the expected reaction of the follower (the drivers). The existence of conges-
tion generates interdependencies between users' decisions, which can also be modeled using
game theory. We will assume that the followers behave according to the noncooperative
principle of Nash (1951).
In his paper Smith (1980) puts forward diﬀerent real life cases where introducing
ﬂow-responsive traﬃc signals has deteriorated journey times, in some cases even by 30%.
In addition, both Gershwin and Tan (1978) and Dickson (1981) have shown, albeit for
a speciﬁc numerical example, that the iterative optimization and assignment procedure
(Cournot) leads to a worse solution than the constrained optimization approach (Stackel-
berg). Despite these results, policy makers generally assume that traﬃc responsive signal
control is the most eﬃcient control policy. The result is that in many cities, signal control
is of the traﬃc responsive type.
The rapid and widespread implementation of traﬃc-responsive signal control is strongly
connected to the intuitive superiority of this control policy. An equal intuitive discourse
is thus needed to challenge this inclination towards responsive signal control. The third
chapter in this thesis therefore provides a clear and accessible comparison of responsive
signal control versus anticipatory signal control. To provide maximum insight for policy
making, we focus on a simple network and represent both the traﬃc responsive and the
anticipatory signal setting procedure in an transparent game theoretical framework. The
results are explained in a intuitive way by recognizing the presence of externalities and the
ﬁrst mover advantage.
Traﬃc lights are in the ﬁrst place designed to manage vehicle conﬂicts at intersections,
allocating green time among conﬂicting streams. But traﬃc lights can also be a powerful
tool to manage traﬃc ﬂow in order to provide a more eﬃcient use of the network. In chapter
4 of this thesis, we study the extent to which traﬃc lights can achieve the same eﬃciency
3
gains as tolls. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that analyzes
under which conditions traﬃc lights can provide an adequate alternative to road pricing.
We focus our analysis on two diﬀerent networks, one in which the traﬃc lights' pri-
mary objective is to regulate an intersection and another network in which traﬃc lights are
installed with as a sole objective to inﬂuence route choice. Both networks are deliberately
kept as simple as possible to allow for clear intuitive results.
We model the signal setting procedure in a ﬁrst stage as a Stackelberg game. In a later
stage we will use the inverse Stackelberg approach (Olsder (2009)), which is an extension
of the basic Stackelberg game.
In the ﬁnal chapter of this thesis, eﬃcient urban transportation policies are at the
forefront. In its communication on the Action Plan on Urban Mobility the European Com-
mission states that "In many urban areas, ..., increasing demand for urban mobility has
created a situation that is not sustainable: severe congestion, poor air quality, noise emis-
sions and high levels of CO2 emissions"(European Commission (2015)). Chapter 5 of this
thesis develops a model in the MOLINO tradition (De Palma et al. (2010), Kilani et al.
(2014)), that allows policy makers to compare diﬀerent transport policies designed to re-
duce congestion externalities, accident risk and noise and air pollution.
Unlike most models that have a high degree of detail and describe users behavior via
discrete choice techniques, this model focuses on a simpliﬁed network and uses aggregate
data to represent user's behavior. As such, calibration of the model requires a minimum
of data allowing policy makers to quickly obtain a ﬁrst impression of the eﬃciency of a
transport policy.
The supply side of the model features a network which allows for combined trips as
well as pure mode-trips. Travel costs encompass access, waiting and in-vehicle time costs.
The demand side of the model consists of multiple user classes, which diﬀer with respect
to their travel preferences, incomes, and costs of travel.
The model is illustrated to the city of Leuven (Belgium). Three transport policies to
reduce the traﬃc externalities in the city center are considered: introducing road pricing in
the city center, raising parking fees in the center of Leuven and expanding public transport.
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1.1 Scope
The study of transportation is approached from various disciplines, including engineering,
economics, geography, psychology, mathematics, . . . . Though having the same subject,
these ﬁelds are generally considered to be only distantly related. This thesis tries to per-
form a bridging function, with papers providing a link between transportation engineering
and transportation economics.
While interacting closely with transportation engineering, the main focus of this thesis
is on the contribution economics can make to the analysis of transportation. The emphasis
is thus more on concepts, illustrated on simple networks, than on speciﬁc design and im-
plementation.
Like any other branch of economics, transportation economics deals with the alloca-
tion of scarce resources. As such, transport economics and eﬃciency are inextricably linked.
The concept of eﬃciency is therefore also central to this thesis. More particularly, Part I of
this thesis deals with eﬃcient traﬃc networks and Part II focuses on eﬃcient transportation
policies. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the diﬀerent chapters.
Table 1.1: Overview of the diﬀerent chapters
Ch Objective Instruments Model
2 Optimization of inter-
sections
Priority rules, traﬃc
lights and tolls
Stackelberg game
3 Comparison of respon-
sive and anticipatory
signal control
Traﬃc lights Stackelberg game
4 Analysis of traﬃc lights
versus road pricing
Road pricing, traﬃc
lights
Stackelberg game, inverse
stackelberg game
5 Comparison of welfare
eﬀects of alternative
transport policies
Parking fees, road pric-
ing, public transit de-
sign
multi-user, multi-period,
multi-modal model in the
MOLINO-tradition
In a nutshell, the four chapters of this thesis cover the following topics:
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Chapter 2: Optimizing Intersections. In this chapter we optimize the regulation of
an intersection of two routes connecting one origin-destination pair and study the eﬀects of
priority rules, traﬃc lights and tolls. We show that when the intersection is regulated by
a priority rule, the optimal policy is generally to block one of the two routes. When the
intersection is regulated by traﬃc lights, it can only be optimal to leave both routes open
when both routes are subject to congestion or if a toll is levied.
This chapter is joint work with Stef Proost and has been published in Transportation
Research Part B: Methodological, 2015, volume 71, pp. 100-119.
Chapter 3: The Puzzle of Traﬃc-Responsive Signal Control. This chapter aims
to show that, contrary to popular belief, traﬃc responsive signal control is not necessarily
the most eﬃcient control policy. More particularly, we show that for an intersection of two
routes connecting one origin-destination pair where only one route is subject to congestion,
anticipatory signal control performs better than traﬃc-responsive signal control. Further-
more, the unfolded logic behind this result suggests that the superiority of anticipatory
signal control also extends to other networks.
This chapter is joint work with Stef Proost and has been published in Transportation
Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2015, volume 77, pp. 350-357.
Chapter 4: Can Traﬃc Lights Achieve the Same Results as Tolls? This chapter
studies the extent to which traﬃc lights can provide an alternative to road pricing in a simple
network with two routes connecting one origin destination pair. We distinguish between
the case in which the main purpose of the traﬃc lights is to regulate the intersection and
the case in which the sole objective of the traﬃc light is to aﬀect route choice. For this
last case, we show that road pricing performs at least as good as traﬃc lights. For the
network in which the traﬃc lights regulate the intersection of the two routes, we show that
the implementation of a ﬂow-dependent signal setting makes road pricing superﬂuous.
Chapter 5: Eﬃcient transportation policies for sustainable cities. In this paper
we compare the eﬀectiveness and welfare eﬀects of alternative transport policies designed to
reduce urban traﬃc externalities. We build a multimodal, multi-class, multi-period model,
which allows for endogenous congestion and total demand elasticity. Pure as well as mixed
modes of transport are considered, and diﬀerent government perspectives are compared.
The model is applied using data from a Belgian medium-size city, suggesting that the city
6
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authority will lobby for measures that are welfare decreasing from societal point of view.
The results furthermore show that road pricing creates better results than increasing park-
ing fees or expanding public transit.
This chapter is joint work with Stef Proost.
7

Part I
Eﬃcient traﬃc networks
9

Chapter 2
Optimizing intersections
2.1 Introduction
Despite decades of research on the optimization of intersections, the poor regulation of in-
tersections is a matter of huge frustration amongst many drivers today. The complexity of
the problem makes the optimization of intersections a tough nut to crack. Understanding
the causal mechanisms that govern the optimal regulation of intersections is therefore es-
sential in dealing with complex network problems. Not least because externalities, resulting
from the behaviour of drivers, can lead to results that defy intuition.
The ﬁrst traﬃc signal control model was studied by Webster (1958). This model as-
sumes traﬃc ﬂows to be unaﬀected by the signal settings. This reduces the model to an
isolated control problem in which signal settings are optimized for given ﬂows on the net-
work. The need to take into account the eﬀects of the change in traﬃc light settings on
the network ﬂow was ﬁrst emphasized by Allsop (1974). This insight has generated two ap-
proaches in the literature that address the interaction between control and assignment: (1)
the iterative procedure and (2) the global optimization approach (Cantarella et al. (1991)).
The iterative procedure iteratively solves the signal setting problem for a ﬁxed ﬂow
pattern and the assignment problem for ﬁxed signal settings until two successive ﬂow pat-
terns or signal settings converge (Allsop and Charlesworth (1977), Cantarella et al. (1991),
Gartner et al. (1980), Lee and Hazelton (1996)). A dynamic approach is proposed by Hu
and Mahmassani (1997) and Lo et al. (2001). With a simple example, Dickson (1981)
11
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showed that the total network cost can increase during the iterative procedure. The itera-
tive procedure does thus not necessarily lead to the optimal solution.
When the global optimization approach is applied, some network objective function is
optimized while taking into account the equilibrium route choice behaviour of the drivers
(Chiou (1999), Cipriani and Fusco (2004), Fisk (1984), Marcotte (1983), Sheﬃ and Powell
(1983), Yang and Yagar (1995)). The global optimization problem can be modelled as a
bilevel programming problem in which the upper level deals with the control problem and
the lower level with the user equilibrium assignment problem. The dynamic approach is
studied by Abu-Lebdeh and Benekohal (2003).
Smith (1979a) provided the necessary mathematical fundamentals of the traﬃc control
and assignment problem by stating the conditions under which the problem has a unique
and stable solution. In later work, he proposes and elaborates a local traﬃc control policy
(called P0) that maximizes network capacity (Smith (1980, 1981)). In successive papers,
Smith extends his work on the combined traﬃc assignment and control problem (see e.g.
Smith and Van Vuren (1993)).
Relatively few papers address both signal optimization and road pricing. Clegg et al.
(2001) explored the use of both instruments by specifying an algorithm that continuously
moves current traﬃc ﬂows, green-times and road prices within the model toward locally-
optimal values. Chiou (2007) proposed a globally convergent iterative scheme designed to
heuristically search for a local optimum.
Fisk (1984) was the ﬁrst to model the combined assignment and control problem as
a Stackelberg game. Chen and Ben-Akiva (1998) developed a dynamic model dealing with
the combined assignment and control problem and formulated it as a Cournot, Stackelberg
and monopoly game. Overall, there have only been a limited number of authors focussing
on the game theoretical perspective of the combined assignment and control problem. For
an overview, see Hollander and Prashker (2006).
This paper follows Fisk's example in modelling the combined assignment and control
problem as a Stackelberg game. In this game the leader (traﬃc authority) moves ﬁrst and
bases his decision on the expected reaction of the follower (the drivers). The behaviour
of the drivers can also be represented as a game, because the congestion on one road is
12
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dependent upon how many users choose to use the same road. We will assume that the
followers behave according to the noncooperative principle of Nash (1951).
To obtain an optimal and tractable solution for the intersection problem, we use a sim-
ple two-road intersection, that can be controlled by either a priority rule or traﬃc lights.
This simpliﬁed network structure can represent diﬀerent types of routes and diﬀerent modes
of transport that are either congestible or insensitive to congestion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 focuses on the case in
which the intersection is regulated by a priority rule. Section 3 presents the main results
when the intersection is regulated by traﬃc lights. Section 4 oﬀers a comparison between
the regulation by traﬃc lights and by a priority rule. Section 5 illustrates the theory by
means of two applications and Section 6 oﬀers a conclusion.
2.2 Priority
In this section, the intersection is regulated by a priority rule. In Section 2.2.2, Route 2 is
considered to have unlimited capacity, while Route 1 is subject to congestion. In Section
2.2.3, we consider the case where both routes have limited capacity. The focus will be on
the main results and the intuition. The complete mathematical derivations are given in
Appendices. Before turning to the results, the assumptions underlying the priority model
will be set out.
2.2.1 Assumptions underlying the priority model
N drivers want to go from point A to point B (Figure 2.1). They can either take Route 1 or
Route 2. The two routes intersect at point C and the intersection is regulated by a priority
rule. Six assumptions are imposed on the model representing the intersection regulated by
a priority rule.
A.1 Demand: total demand is inelastic and equals N.
A.2 Homogeneous users: all users are identical and try to minimize their expected user
cost. The stationary distribution of vehicles will be a Wardrop equilibrium (Wardrop
(1952)).
A.3 Arrival rate: the arrival rate is static.
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Figure 2.1: Outline of an intersection of two routes connecting one OD pair (AB) regulated by a
priority rule.
A.4 Undersaturated conditions: the arrivals at the intersection on Route 2 in the time
interval 1X1 don't exceed the number of Route 2-drivers that can cross the intersection
in the time interval ( 1X1 − v).
A.5 Priority: Route 1 always has priority.
A.6 Time cost of priority: v hours before a car on Route 1 passes C, cars on Route 2
already wait until the car on Route 1 has passed.
Proposition 1. When the intersection of two routes connecting one OD pair is regulated
by a priority rule, the optimal policy is generally to block one of the two routes. The only
exception is the case where the marginal congestion cost on the minor route is greater than
half of the square of the marginal waiting cost (a2 >
v2
2 ). In this scenario, the optimal
policy is to leave both routes open.
2.2.2 Only one route subject to congestion
Let a1 be the increase in average cost on Route 1 when one vehicle is added, we call it the
sensitivity to congestion; let Xi equal the ﬂow on route i ; let ω be the resource cost for a
trip from A to C; let φi stand for the minimal time cost from A to C of route i ; and let
v2X1
2 be the expected waiting time cost
1 on Route 2 at the intersection. When two parallel
routes connect one OD pair, the government can use three possible policies to maximize
1The waiting time cost function is derived in Appendix E.
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total welfare: to block Route 1, to block Route 2, or to leave both routes open. The users
in turn can react in three ways to any chosen policy: to only take Route 1, to only use
Route 2, or to use both routes. If the government decides to block Route 1, then all drivers
need to take Route 2 and the total cost will equal (ω + φ2)N . If, on the other hand,
the government blocks Route 2, then the user equilibrium will be X1 = N and the total
cost will be (a1N + ω + φ1)N . If, however, the government decides to leave both routes
open, the equilibrium reaction of the drivers will be X1 = N if a1N + φ1 < φ2 +
v2(N−1)
2 ,
X2 = N if φ1 > φ2 and the drivers will use both routes if φ1 ≤ φ2 ≤ 1N +φ1− v
2(N−1)
2 . In
this last case the Wardrop equilibrium implies
(
ω + φ2 +
v2Xe2
2
)
N as total cost. The user
equilibrium in which both routes are used is, however, never optimal from the government's
point of view. Therefore, it is always optimal to block one of the two routes.
Which route to block depends on the relative cost of both routes: a rational authority
minimizing the social cost closes Route 1 if a1N + φ1 > φ2, and Route 2 if a1N + φ1 < φ2.
Remark that if the interior equilibrium exists, it is always optimal to block the route
with limited capacity. This result can be explained intuitively. If both routes are used,
drivers on the minor (uncongested) route incur a waiting cost, whereas if only the minor
(uncongested) route were to be used, no waiting cost would be incurred and, compared to
the interior solution, no other additional costs are incurred. If on the other hand only the
congested route were to be used, then the total cost would be higher than for the interior
solution due to additional congestion costs. We have shown this result for linear average
cost functions, but this result holds more generally for any travel cost function in which
the running time is a continuous nonlinear nondecreasing function of the ﬂow. Indeed, the
main driver of the result is the additional waiting time externality that is imposed when
using both Route 1 and Route 2. If there is an internal solution where both user costs are
equal, it is always optimal to have all users only using Route 2 as this cost is always lower
by avoiding the priority waiting costs.
In the absence of a government intervention blocking one road, the driver will often
make the sub-optimal choice. Indeed, whenever a1N + φ1 − v
2(N−1)
2 < φ2 < a1N + φ1, the
user equilibrium is X1 = N , while X2 = N would be optimal. On the other hand, whenever
φ1 < φ2 < a1N + φ1 − v
2(N−1)
2 there will be an equilibrium in which both routes are used,
while it would be optimal to have all drivers on Route 2. Figure 2.2 illustrates this second
situation. The Wardrop equilibrium is given by the intersection of the average cost-curves
of Route 2 and Route 1 (point G).2 It is clear that the total cost for the interior solution
2Note that for interior solutions every additional user on Route 1 imposes an extra waiting cost for the
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Figure 2.2: The solution in which all travellers use Route 2 (E) is optimal. However, without
intervention, the interior solution (G) will be the user equilibrium.
equals ABCD, while the total cost would only equal ABFE if Route 1 had been blocked.
This can be seen as an illustration of the Braess paradox (Braess (1968)). In the
Braess paradox, adding one additional link can increase total travel cost. Braess' paradox
occurs because the congestion externality is not taken into account by the drivers. Here,
we also add a link and, in this case, it is the external waiting cost that users on the main
road impose on the users of the minor road that can increase the total travel cost.
2.2.3 Both routes subject to congestion
The suboptimality of an interior solution continues to hold for the case in which both routes
are subject to congestion and a2 ≤ v22 (with a2 the sensitivity to congestion of Route 2).
However, when a2 ≥ v22 , the total cost can be at lowest when both routes are used in
equilibrium.
In the Stackelberg game the traﬃc authority (leader) moves ﬁrst and bases her decision
on the expected reaction of the drivers (follower). Figure 2.3 illustrates this sequential game
and shows the diﬀerent options for the government and the possible reactions of the drivers.
drivers on Route 2. This explains the upward sloping AC curve of Route 2 for increasing X1.
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Figure 2.3: The total travel costs resulting from a Stackelberg game.
When the government decides to close Route 1, the user equilibrium will be X2 = N , and
the total cost will be (a2N + ω + φ2)N . When only Route 1 is accessible, X1 = N will be
the only equilibrium, and the total cost will amount to (a1N+φ1+ω)N . When both routes
are accessible, the user equilibrium that will be in place depends on the relative value of
the parameters: X2 = N if a2N + φ2 < φ1; X1 = N if a1N + φ1 < φ2 + v
2
2 (N − 1); and
0 < Xe1 < N in all other cases.
Taking into account the reaction of the drivers, the government will block one of the
two routes if a2 < v
2
2 , and leave both routes open if a2 ≥ v
2
2 . The optimal policy thus
depends on the ratio of the congestion coeﬃcient (a2) to the reaction time (v). If a2 < v
2
2 ,
the situation is similar to the case where only one route is subject to congestion and then it
is always optimal to block one of the two routes. If a2 ≥ v22 and the government leaves both
routes open, it can be shown that in the user equilibrium the lowest cost will be attained.
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In graphical terms, a2 < v
2
2 boils down to an upward sloping (in X1) average cost
curve of Route 2, while a2 > v
2
2 boils down to a downward sloping ACroute2-curve. The
underlying logic is that if a2 ≥ v22 , the extra congestion cost of having all travellers on
Route 2 is more costly than the saving in waiting costs. If, however, a2 < v
2
2 , the opposite
is true.
Figure 2.4: The interior solution (G) is optimal. No government intervention is needed to reach
the optimal solution.
2.3 Traﬃc lights
In this section, the two-road intersection is regulated by traﬃc lights. Following the same
approach as in the previous section, ﬁrst only one route is considered to have limited
capacity, and subsequently both routes are considered to have limited capacity.
2.3.1 Assumptions underlying the traﬃc lights model
Five assumptions are imposed on the model representing the intersection regulated by traﬃc
lights.
A.1 Demand: total demand is inelastic and equals N. This assumption is relaxed in Section
2.3.3.2.
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Figure 2.5: Outline of an intersection of two routes connecting one OD pair (AB) regulated by
traﬃc lights.
A.2 Homogeneous users: all users are identical and try to minimize their expected user
cost. The stationary distribution of vehicles will be a Wardrop equilibrium.
A.3 Arrival rate: the arrival rate is static.
A.4 Undersaturated conditions: vehicle queues are only created during red phases, and
fully dissipate during green phases. This assumption is relaxed in Section 2.3.2.1.
A.5 Cycle time: to simplify matters, the cycle time3 `c' is held ﬁxed. Hence, it follows that
including intergreen time in the analysis is not relevant and will thus be ignored.
In this paper, the variable `r' represents the red time on Route 2 and will be the
main control variable. The corresponding green time on Route 2 will thus be (c-r) and a
reverse scenario holds for Route 1. As there will be alternating red times to avoid collisions
at the intersection, both routes will experience an expected traﬃc light waiting time cost
(T1 (c, r) , T2 (c, r)). The traﬃc light waiting cost functions are increasing in the red time
and decreasing in the green time (∂T1(c,r)∂r < 0,
∂T2(c,r)
∂r > 0). Furthermore, the expected
traﬃc light waiting functions are discontinuous and jump to inﬁnity when it is always red.
2.3.2 Only one route subject to congestion
In this section, only one route is considered to have limited capacity. In Section 2.3.2.1 the
optimal policy is determined for the case in which the traﬃc authority can only control the
3That is the duration of the sum of green time and red time.
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traﬃc lights. In Section 2.3.2.2 the traﬃc authority can use both signal settings and a toll
to minimize total costs.
2.3.2.1 Traﬃc lights without road pricing
Proposition 2. When the intersection of two routes connecting one OD pair is regulated
by traﬃc lights and only one of the two routes is congested, a signal setting whereby drivers
choose to use both routes can never be an optimal policy.
Table 2.1: The total travel cost for every (r, UE)-combination
Signal setting X1 = N X2 = N 0 < X1 < N
r = c (a1N + φ1 + ω)N ∞ ∞
r = 0 ∞ (ω + φ2)N ∞
0 < r < c (a1N + ω + φ1 + T1)N (ω + φ2 + T2)N (ω + φ2 + T2)N
Table 2.1 shows that a rational government will never decide on an alternating signal
setting when both routes are substitutes. Indeed, let Ti (c, r) be the expected waiting time
cost on route i at the intersection.4 As Ti (c, r) is positive when 0 < r < c, the total travel
cost for an alternating signal setting will always be higher than for r = c or r = 0. Which
of the two non-alternating signal settings will be optimal is dependent on the values of the
parameters a1, N, φ1 and φ2. When a1N +φ1 < φ2, r = c is the optimal solution and when
a1N + φ1 ≥ φ2, r = 0 will be implemented.5
The suboptimality of an alternating signal (0 < r < c) in case the intersection is
regulated by traﬃc lights and only one route is subject to congestion, can be explained in-
tuitively. When the user equilibrium isX2 = N orX1 = N (i.e. φ2+T2 (c, r) < φ1+T1 (c, r)
or a1N +φ1+T1 (c, r) < φ2+T2 (c, r) respectively), drivers have to wait at the traﬃc light
while there is no one crossing the intersection. The intuition behind the suboptimality of
an alternating signal setting when the user equilibrium is 0 < Xe1 < N is shown in Figure
2.6. If the duration of red light for Route 2 is reduced, then the expected average waiting
time on Route 1 increases, indicated by an upward shift of the ACroute1 curve in Figure 2.6.
At the same time, the expected average waiting time for Route 2 decreases, corresponding
4We will assume that the saturation ﬂow s is very large in comparison to the arrival rate Xi, so that the
traﬃc light waiting time due to departure delay is negligible.
5The optimality of only one route (mode) connecting one OD pair remains valid in the case where both
routes have unlimited capacity. The total minimal cost then equals (ω + φi)N with i the route index that
procures the lowest minimal time cost.
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Figure 2.6: A corner solution constitutes the optimal solution; in this case: X2 = N .
to a downward shift of the ACroute2 curve. This forces the switching point G to the left,
hence less people travel on Route 1 with a simultaneous decrease in total cost. From the
graph it is clear that the lowest cost (area ABFE) will be achieved when it is always green
for drivers on Route 2 (grey line). It is noted that the ACroute1 curve would lie inﬁnitely
high in this situation.
This can be viviﬁed by the following example: consider the situation in which demand
from point A to point B is relatively inelastic. Suppose A and B are connected by a tram6
and a road plagued by traﬃc congestion. Users are indiﬀerent between the two modes, only
the user cost matters. The tram line intersects the road trajectory, and this intersection
is regulated by traﬃc lights. In this situation, even though counterintuitive, the optimal
policy would either be to close the road and only maintain the tram, or to remove the tram
and only keep the road, depending on the relative costs of the two scenarios.
Proposition 2 can be generalized to average cost function in which the running time
component is a continuous nonlinear nondecreasing function of the ﬂow. Indeed, the main
driver of the result is that any interior solution can be improved by either giving only green
to Route 2 or giving only green to Route 1. So the result does not depend on the precise
6The tram is assumed to be relatively insensitive to congestion and a substitute for the car.
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curvature of the average cost function of Route 1. Furthermore, when we relax the assump-
tion that the waiting time due to departure delay is negligible,7 the result obtained in this
subsection is still valid, since any interior solution is more costly than the solution for either
r = 0 or r = c.
Figure 2.7: The total cost when traﬃc conditions are saturated is at least as high as when condi-
tions are undersaturated.
Finally, we can show that Proposition 2 can also be generalized to saturated traﬃc
conditions. Remark ﬁrst that saturated traﬃc conditions can only occur for alternating
signal settings. Indeed, if r = 0 or r = c, the traﬃc light can not be the restricting factor.
Suppose that the demand and the relative time and resource costs are such that there exists
a signal setting for which the amount of drivers arriving at the intersection on Route 1 is
larger than the amount of drivers that can exit the intersection. That is, there is an r
for which Xe1c > s1r, with c the cycle time, X
e
1 the equilibrium ﬂow on Route 1, s1 the
saturation ﬂow and r the green time for Route 1 per cycle. In this case, a queue will develop
on Route 1, the time cost for Route 1 will go up, and the drivers will shift from Route 1
to Route 2. If the capacity on Route 2 is not suﬃcient to accommodate the excess demand
of Route 1, then the total demand (N) will decrease,8 which results in a loss of surplus. If
Route 2 has enough spare capacity to accommodate the shifting Route 1 drivers, then we
know from Yang and Yagar (1995) that in the steady state, Xe1c equals s1r and the queue
waiting time cost will be such that the user cost on Route 1 and Route 2 is equal. From
7In this case, the user cost for Route 1 is a1X1+φ1+ω+
(c−r)2
2c
(
1−X1
s1
) and the user cost for Route 2 equals
φ2 + ω +
r2
2c
(
1−X2
s2
) .
8Inelastic demand was assumed here. This, however, is always relatively inelastic, because if the user
cost becomes inﬁnitely large on both routes, the drivers will refrain from making the trip.
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Figure 2.7 (graph on the left-hand side) it is clear that the total cost in this case is as high
as the total cost for the same signal setting in the undersaturated case. Figure 2.7 (graph
on the right-hand side) furthermore shows that if Route 2 has the limiting capacity, the
total cost is higher than the total cost for the same signal setting in the undersaturated case.
From the analysis of the undersaturated case, we know that the total cost for an alter-
nating signal setting is always higher than for either r = 0 or r = c. If traﬃc conditions can
be saturated, then the optimal signal setting can lead to either saturated or undersaturated
conditions. Given that we have shown that for saturated conditions, the total cost is at
least as high as for the same signal setting in the undersaturated case, we can conclude that
also in the saturated case it is optimal to use only one of the two routes.
2.3.2.2 Traﬃc lights and road pricing
In this subsection, both signal settings and a toll (τ) are instruments the authorities can
use to minimize total costs. The toll is levied on the route subject to congestion, and the
toll revenues are subtracted from the total cost. Note that with ﬁxed demand, a toll on
Route 1 is equivalent to a subsidy to the users of Route 2.
Proposition 3. When the intersection of two routes connecting one OD pair is regulated by
traﬃc lights and only one route is subject to congestion, then an alternating signal setting
can be optimal if a toll is possible.
Table 2.2: The total travel cost for every (τ , r, UE)-combination
Signal & toll X1=N X2=N 0<X1<N
r=c (a1N+ω+φ1)N ∞ ∞
r=0 ∞ (φ2+ω)N ∞
0<r<c, τ>0 (a1N+ω+φ1+T1)N (φ2+ω+T2)N (a1Xe1+ω+φ1+T1)N+τX
e
2
From Table 2.2 it is clear that a rational authority will only implement an alternating
signal setting if both routes are used in the user equilibrium. It can be shown that if
there exists an optimal alternating signal setting and an optimal toll (i.e. if 2a1N > c and
2a1N − c2 + φ1 > φ2 > φ1 + c2), both routes are used. So, the optimal (r, τ) combination
can be obtained as the solution of the following minimization problem:
min
X1,X2,r,τ
(a1X1 + ω + φ1 + T1 (c, r) + τ)X1 + (ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r))X2 − τX1 (2.1)
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s.t.
X1 +X2 = N (2.2)
a1X1 + ω + φ1 + T1 (c, r) + τ = ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r) (2.3)
0 ≤ r ≤ c (2.4)
X1 > 0 (2.5)
X2 > 0 (2.6)
τ > 0 (2.7)
Now that a toll can be levied, the external costs on Route 1 are taken into account in
the user equilibrium. The optimal toll is (Appendix A):
τ =
φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)
2
(2.8)
Assuming undersaturated traﬃc conditions, i.e. queues at the intersection are only cre-
ated during the red phases and dissolved during the green phases, the traﬃc light functions
take the following form for 0 < r < c (see Appendix E):
T1 (c, r) =
(c− r)2
2c
(2.9)
T2 (c, r) =
r2
2c
(2.10)
The optimal toll can then be written as follows:
τ∗ =
φ2 − φ1 − c2 + r
2
(2.11)
As ∂τ/∂r > 0, the optimal toll on Route 1 is increasing in r (the green time on Route
1). The intuition is the following: if the green time increases on the congested route, people
will switch from Route 2 to Route 1 to take advantage of the extra green time. However,
this causes Route 1 to be even more congested. As individuals do not take into account the
eﬀect of their switching on the existing drivers on Route 1, the toll has to increase in order
to reach a social optimum for given traﬃc light settings.
The dependence of the optimal toll on the optimal traﬃc light setting drives the state-
ment that the implementation of optimal signal settings can lead to a higher acceptance
of toll roads. First, in the absence of a toll, the optimal policy is to block one of the two
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routes. When a toll becomes available on Route 1, it can be optimal to open both routes,
which increases the possibilities for the drivers. Second, consider a suboptimal signal set-
ting without toll where the congested Route 1 receives a very low green time. When a toll
can be implemented on Route 1, one can increase the green time on Route 1.
The optimal r is deﬁned by the following equation in which N represents the total
amount of vehicles, τ the toll, a1 the sensitivity to congestion on Route 1, and Ti (c, r) the
expected waiting time cost on route i at the intersection (A).(
−N + τ
a1
)
∂T2 (c, r)
∂r
=
τ
a1
∂T1 (c, r)
∂r
(2.12)
Combining equations (2.8) and (2.12) allows us to identify the optimal r as the solution
of the following equation:
(φ2 − 2a1N − φ1 + T2 − T1) ∂T2 (c, r)
∂r
= (φ2 − φ1 + T2 − T1) ∂T1 (c, r)
∂r
(2.13)
Assuming undersaturated traﬃc conditions and using the results from Appendix E,
the optimal r as a function of the exogenous parameters can be obtained from equation
(2.13):
r∗ =
(
φ1 − φ2 + c2
)
c
−2a1N + c (2.14)
When 2a1N−c < 0, the optimal (r, τ) combination is a saddle point, and consequently
the minimum will be near the boundary (Appendix A). On the other hand, if 2a1N−c ≥ 0,
the optimal (r, τ) combination provides the minimum attainable costs.
To identify the optimal policy, the total cost needs to be compared for all three poli-
cies. When the user equilibrium is X2 = N or X1 = N , tolls and traﬃc lights are not
needed. Therefore, the total costs equal (ω + φ2)N in case r = 0, and (a1N + ω + φ1)N
in case r = c.
If the optimal alternating signal setting exists, i.e. if 2a1N > c and 2a1N − c2 + φ1 >
φ2 > φ1 +
c
2 , then the corresponding cost is always lower than the cost for r = 0 or r = c
(Appendix G). If an optimal alternating signal setting does not exist, then it is optimal to
implement r = c if φ2 > φ1 + a1N , whereas it is optimal for Route 2 if φ2 ≤ φ1 + a1N .
Figure 2.8 schematically depicts the situation in which a toll is levied on the limited
capacity route in a two-road network and the intersection is regulated by traﬃc lights. In
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Figure 2.8: The interior solution (I) is optimal.
this graph the signal settings are considered optimal. It is clear that an interior solution
exists (point I). A switch toward the corner solution X2 = N is accompanied by a cost
reduction equal to the area ABCD. This equals:
N
r∗2
2c
= N
(
φ1 − φ2 + c2
)2
c
2 (−2a1N + c)2
(2.15)
However, the toll revenue obtained at the interior solution equals area AIFE. This is:
X1τ(X1) =
(
φ2 − φ1 + r∗ − c2
)2
4a1
(2.16)
In Appendix F, it is shown that area AIFE is larger than area ABCD. Therefore, in
this case, the interior optimum is better than the corner solution X2 = N . This conﬁrms
the previous statement that if an interior optimum exists, it leads to lower costs than the
corner solutions.
Figure 2.8 also shows that, if the optimal τ is levied and if the traﬃc light settings are
optimal, the user equilibrium corresponds to the social optimum. This makes sense, as the
externality is internalized by the toll.
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2.3.3 Both routes subject to congestion
We will ﬁrst focus on the case in which demand is inelastic and then extend the analysis to
include elastic demand.
2.3.3.1 Inelastic demand
Proposition 4. When the intersection of two congested routes connecting one OD pair is
regulated by traﬃc lights, the optimal alternating signal setting is independent of the total
ﬂow and is given by r = a2ca1+a2 .
Figure 2.9: The total costs when the combined assignment and control problem is modelled as a
Stackelberg game.
The government ﬁrst decides on the signal settings and the drivers subsequently de-
termine which route to take. Figure 2.9 illustrates this sequential game and shows all
the feasible signal settings and the reaction of the drivers to each of these signal settings.
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The third branch, representing the decision of the government to implement an alternating
signal setting (0 < r < c), considers all red times between zero and c.
It can be shown that, if there exists an alternating signal setting for which the total cost
is lower than for any non-alternating r ( i.e., if a1Xe1+T1 (c, r) < a1N and a2X
e
2+T2 (c, r) <
a2N), then the user equilibrium for this r is the one in which both routes are used. Hence,
the optimal alternating signal setting is the solution of the following optimization problem:
min
X1,X2,r
(a1X1 + ω + φ1 + T1 (c, r))X1 + (a2X2 + ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r))X2 (2.17)
s.t.
X1 +X2 = N (2.18)
a1X1 + ω + φ1 + T1 (c, r) = a2X2 + ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r) (2.19)
0 < r < c, X1 > 0, X2 > 0 (2.20)
The solution will be determined by:
a1
∂T2 (c, r)
∂r
= −a2∂T1 (c, r)
∂r
(2.21)
Assuming undersaturated traﬃc conditions, the explicit waiting time functions are
given by equations (2.9) and (2.10). Inserting these expressions in equation (2.21), and
solving for r, the proportion of red time for Route 2 equals:
r∗
c
=
a2
a1 + a2
(2.22)
Even though the minimal time costs add to the total costs and we would therefore
expect them to appear in the formula, they are not part of the optimal signal setting-
formula. This can be explained by observing that the drivers themselves take the minimal
time cost into account when choosing a route, while they omit the external congestion cost
in their decision criterium. This omission is corrected by the optimal signal setting. The
optimal red time on Route 2 increases in a2a2+a1 . The more congestible Route 2 is compared
to Route 1, the more users will take Route 1 and thus a larger cost reduction is expected
from an increase in green time on Route 1.
The total cost that the optimal traﬃc light settings produce is given by the following
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equation: (
2a1a2 (a1 + a2)N + 2a1 (a1 + a2) (φ2 − φ1) + a1a2c
(a1 + a2)
2 2
+ φ1 + ω
)
N (2.23)
If this cost is lower than (a1N + ω + φ1)N and (a2N + ω + φ2)N , then the optimal
policy is to implement r= a2ca1+a2 . If, on the other hand, the parameters are such that
(a1N + ω + φ1)N is the lowest cost, then the optimal policy would be to only give green
to Route 1. Finally, if (a2N + ω + φ2)N is the lowest cost a rational authority would
implement r = 0.
2.3.3.2 Elastic demand
Proposition 5. When the intersection of two congested routes connecting one OD pair
is regulated by traﬃc lights, the optimal signal setting is independent of the elasticity of
demand.
Figure 2.10: Equilibrium with elastic demand curve.
Regardless of the number of drivers that go from A to C, both routes will be used
in the user equilibrium that comes about when the authorities implement an alternating
signal setting. Taking this into account, we can construct an aggregate average cost func-
tion (Appendix C). The optimal alternating signal setting is the solution of the following
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maximization problem with XT the total ﬂow in the network and (δ − piXT ) the demand
function:
max
r,XT
∫ XT
0
(
(δ−piXT )−
(
2
a1a2
a1+a2
XT+2
a1φ2+a2φ1
a1+a2
+2ω+
a1T2 (c, r)+a2T1 (c, r)
a1+a2
))
dXT
(2.24)
s.t.
2a1a2XT
a1 + a2
+
2 (a1φ2 + a2φ1)
a1 + a2
+ 2ω +
a1T2 (c, r) + a2T1 (c, r)
a1 + a2
= δ − piXT (2.25)
XT ≥ 0 (2.26)
c > r > 0 (2.27)
XT is determined by equalizing the elastic demand function (δ−piXT ) and the aggre-
gate average cost function (2.25) and can be written as follows:
XT =
(a1 + a2) δ − 2ω (a1 + a2)− 2a1φ2 − 2a2φ1 − a1T2 (c, r)− a2T1 (c, r)
(a1 + a2)pi + 2a1a2
(2.28)
Assuming traﬃc conditions are undersaturated, equations (2.9) and (2.10) hold, and
can be introduced in the optimization function. The optimal red time is then given by :
r∗ = a2c
a1 + a2
(2.29)
This equation shows that the optimal red time is independent of the total ﬂow within
the network and yields the same result as in the case with inelastic demand. Therefore,
it can be concluded that the optimal alternating signal settings are independent of the
elasticity of demand when both routes have limited capacity.
2.4 The choice between traﬃc lights and a priority rule
Proposition 6. If only one route is subject to congestion, then for all r <
√
v2c φ2−φ1
a1− v22
traﬃc lights are better than a priority rule. Furthermore, the higher the total number of
drivers, the larger the cost advantage of traﬃc lights compared to a priority rule.
If for some reason both routes have to be used and if r can be chosen such that
r <
√
v2c φ2−φ1
a1− v22
and 0 < r < c, then traﬃc lights are the better choice. This can be seen
as follows: if both routes have to be used when traﬃc lights are present, the total cost
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amounts to (ω+φ2+ r
2
2c )N . Comparing this with the total cost in a priority rule situation,(
ω + φ2 +
v2Xe1
2
)
N , it is clear that if r
2
2c <
v2Xe1
2 (this comes down to r <
√
v2cXe1), traﬃc
lights reduce the total cost. The cost savings that accompany the transfer to traﬃc light
regulation thus equal (
v2
φ2−φ1
a1− v
2
2
2 − r
2
2c )N . If this value exceeds the additional annualized
investment cost, traﬃc lights are optimal.
A further examination on the condition on r (r <
√
v2c φ2−φ1
a1− v22
) shows that traﬃc lights
become more interesting when drivers are more careful (higher v). This is explicable, a
higher v increases the lost time when the intersection is regulated by a priority rule, leading
to a favourable regulation of the intersection by traﬃc lights.
2.5 Two applications
In this section, some of the theoretical results obtained in the previous section are illustrated
with an example.
The ﬁrst example applies a result of Section 2.2.2: when the intersection of two routes
connecting one OD pair, of which only one is congestible, is regulated by a priority rule
and the interior equilibrium exists, then the optimal policy is to block the congested route.
The second example extends the results obtained in Section 2.3.2 by including local traﬃc
within the problem setting.
2.5.1 A low-traﬃc city center
Consider a city where the inhabitants live on the edge of the city and work in the city
center. There is a bike path, as well as a congestible road connecting work and home, and
both are currently being used for commuting trips. In the city center, cyclists always have
to give way to cars. Applying the results of Section 2.2.2 to this situation, we can conclude
that for this city, the optimal policy would be to make the city center a car-free zone.
A city center in which no motorized traﬃc at all is allowed, is however, unrealistic.
After all, shops have to be provisioned and emergency vehicles have to be able to enter the
center. A simple solution, already adopted in many cities, is to allow only certain vehicles
to enter the city center. This can be implemented using, for example, automatic rising
bollards.
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Figure 2.11: Commuters can take the car or the bicycle.
2.5.2 A bypass and a city road
A well-known situation in which one OD pair is connected by two parallel roads is rep-
resented in Figure 2.12. Here, transit traﬃc can choose between Route 1 or Route 2 to
reach point C, while local traﬃc can only take Route 2. Let Route 1 (the bypass) have a
large capacity. Furthermore, we will assume that both local traﬃc and cut-through traﬃc
contribute to the city road congestion. Suppose that the traﬃc lights are regulated by a
federal authority whose objective is to minimize the total cost of all drivers.
Let
Xb be the number of transit drivers taking the bypass per hour;
Xv be the number of transit drivers taking the city road per hour;
av be the congestion sensitivity of the city road;
φv be the minimal time cost to get to point C using the city road;
φb be the minimal time cost to get to point C using the bypass;
R be the local traﬃc per hour;
N be the total transit traﬃc per hour;
Ti (c, r) be the total waiting time cost at the traﬃc light on route i ;
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Figure 2.12: Transit traﬃc will either take the city road or the bypass depending on the signal
settings.
and r be the red time for the city road.
Table 2.3: The total travel cost for every (r,UE)-combination in a bypass situation
Signal setting Xb = N, Xv = N 0 < Xb < N
r = c ∞ ∞ ∞
r = 0 ∞ (φv + av(N +R))(N +R) ∞
0 < r < c (avR+ φv + Tv)R (av(N +R) + φv + Tv)(N +R) (φb + Tb)(N +R)
+(φb + Tb)N
In Table 2.3, the total cost is shown for every combination of policy and user equilib-
rium. A glance at the table shows that a rational authority would never implement r = c.
When the city road always has green (r = 0), the only Nash equilibrium is Xv = N . The
total cost in this case amounts to (φv + av (R+N)) (R+N). Furthermore, the total cost
for the combination (Xv = N , 0 < r < c) is always larger than the total cost for the combi-
nation (Xv = N , r = 0). Finally, it can be shown that the FOC of (φb + Tb)(N +R) w.r.t.
r is always negative. As a consequence, the lowest cost when both routes are used occurs
at the signal setting for which transit traﬃc is indiﬀerent between using both routes and
using only the bypass. The total cost curve when Xb = N is convex. Here, the minimum
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of this total cost curve equals r = NcN+R .
The previous observations narrow down the candidate solutions to either r = 0,
r = −avR − φv + φb + c2 or r = NcN+R . In order to determine the optimal signal set-
ting, the government has to compare the cost of the diﬀerent solutions.
Suppose now that the city road has limited capacity, then how will this change the
results? From Section 2.3.2.1, we know that if a signal setting leads to saturated conditions
on the city road and both routes are used, the total cost will be the same as in the under-
saturated case. Consequently, the ﬁrst order condition of the total cost function will again
be negative and the optimal solution will be the signal setting for which transit traﬃc is
indiﬀerent between using both routes and using only the bypass.
The minimal green time for which all the local drivers are below capacity (r = c− Rcsv )
will be an element of the interval for which Xb = N . If r = c − Rcsv is greater than NcN+R ,
then either NcN+R , r = −avR− φv + φb + c2 , or r = 0, will be the optimal solution. If on the
other hand r = c− Rcsv is lower than NcN+R , then either r = c− Rcsv , r = −avR− φv + φb+ c2 ,
or r = 0, will be the optimal solution.9
It is clear that a local government, preferring minimal transit traﬃc in its city, would
try to avoid the (Xv = N) outcome. The local government can do this by increasing av
or φv.10 Increasing av or φv raises the cost of the (Xv = N , r = 0) combination relatively
more,11 which decreases the likelihood of the federal govenment implementing r = 0.
Today, many cities already apply this strategy. Indeed, speed bumps and speed limits are
put in place to increase φv and local governments limit the capacity of roads to increase av
(De Borger and Proost (2013)).
2.6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we studied the eﬀects of a priority rule, traﬃc lights, and a toll on an
intersection of two routes connecting one OD pair. We derived the intersection regulation
that minimizes total travel cost, taking into account Wardrop's principles and the delay at
the intersection.
9The demand function of the local drivers is assumed inelastic, so it is relatively expensive to drive back
the demand. So even if for Nc
N+R
the total cost is minimal, the loss in consumer surplus of the drivers that
no longer make the trip still reduces welfare.
10We only mention the parameters the local government can inﬂuence.
11( dTCr=0
dφv
>
dTC
r= Nc
N+R
dφv
and dTCr=0
dav
>
dTC
r= Nc
N+R
dav
)
34
CHAPTER 2. OPTIMIZING INTERSECTIONS
We have four major results. First, if the intersection is regulated by a priority rule, the
optimal policy is generally to block one of the two routes. Second, if the intersection is
regulated by traﬃc lights, and only one route is congestible, the optimal policy is again to
block one route. However, the addition of a toll allows for an optimal alternating signal
setting. Third, if the intersection is regulated by traﬃc lights, the optimal alternating
signal setting is always independent of the elasticity of demand. Finally, if only one route
is subject to congestion, the superiority of a regulation by traﬃc lights over a priority rule
becomes more likely the lower the reaction time of the drivers, and the higher the cycle
time.
These results are important for three reasons. First, the counter-intuitive nature of these
results conﬁrms the importance of a good understanding of the causal mechanisms that
govern the optimal regulation. Second, these insights allow to solve larger networks more
eﬃciently as well as more eﬀectively. More eﬃcient, because the increased insight in the
location of the optimal solution allows for a reduction in computation time. More eﬀective,
because local optima can be detected more easily. Finally, the obtained results can be
applied in practice. Our results can be useful in diﬀerent contexts. We primarly think
about two parallel roads (e.g. a road through an urban area and a parallel road bypassing
the city) or two parallel modes (e.g. a train and a road connecting two cities).
The results in this paper can be applied to solve one particular larger network problem.
In this network problem the two routes are a chain of individual components similar to the
one solved in this paper. If, for every component, it is optimal to use one and the same
link,12 it can be concluded that it is optimal to maintain only one route. As this composition
technique can only be applied to a certain type of network problems, one future research
line is to extend the model to larger networks. Other future work includes the extension of
the model towards multiple government levels.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported ﬁnancially by the OT/11/068-project. The authors wish to thank
three anonymous referees, the Editor-in-Chief Hai Yang as well as C. Tampère, F. Viti and
participants at the ITEA meeting (Northwestern 2013) for helpful suggestions on a previous
draft.
12We can use the results from this paper to solve this problem on the component level.
35
2.6. Concluding remarks
36
Glossary
Parameters
δ maximum willingness-to-pay for a trip from A to B
ω resource cost per trip from A to C
φ1 minimal time cost to go from A to C using route 1
φ2 minimal time cost to go from A to C using Route 2
pi marginal willingness-to-pay for a trip from A to B
a1 increase in average cost on Route 1 when one vehicle is added
a2 increase in average cost on Route 2 when one vehicle is added
c cycle length
N total inelastic demand from A to B
s1 saturation ﬂow of Route 1
s2 saturation ﬂow of Route 2
v time gap in which the users of the minor road are stationary at the intersection
before the crossing of a main road user
Control variables
τ toll fee
r duration of red per cycle given to Route 2
Variables
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X1 ﬂow on Route 1
X2 ﬂow on Route 2
XT total ﬂow in the network
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Chapter 3
The puzzle of traﬃc-responsive signal
control: why common sense does not
always make sense.
3.1 Introduction
A lot of the current signal control systems are based on traﬃc-responsive control. This
type of control allocates green time in proportion to the relative magnitude of the ﬂow. In
this paper, we show that, though intuitively superior, this type of control is not necessarily
the most eﬃcient. The main reason is that in traﬃc networks the user equilibrium is often
not optimal. Blindly attempting to accommodate to the volume of traﬃc on a link with
congestion, by adding capacity or by giving more green time, is a widespread problem,
which can, more generally, be ascribed to the phenomenon of induced demand.
The theory of induced demand asserts that improvements in the transportation in-
frastructure attract new traﬃc. The available literature has largely centered around the
demand-inducing and traﬃc diversion eﬀects of particularly road expansion (Downs (1962),
Braess (1968), Noland (2001)). This literature has provided a basis for a major rethinking
of road-expansion policies. Recognition of the generated traﬃc eﬀects of traﬃc-responsive
control can inﬂuence policy making in the same way.
In many cities, signal control is of the traﬃc responsive type. The control system SCOOT,
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for example, has been implemented in more than 250 towns and cities (Hamilton et al.
(2013)). The rapid and widespread implementation of traﬃc-responsive signal control is
strongly connected to the intuitive superiority of this control policy, which made it politi-
cally more acceptable. An equal intuitive discourse is needed to challenge this inclination
towards responsive signal control. The objective of this paper is therefore to provide a clear
and accessible comparison of responsive signal control versus anticipatory signal control,
which provides insight for policy making.
Already in 1974, the need to take into account the interaction between route choice and
signal control was pointed out by Allsop (1974). In most papers nowadays the importance
of this interaction is recognized and the interaction is thus included in the model. The way
this interaction is modelled diﬀers, however, from paper to paper. Here, two speciﬁc ways
to model this interaction, i.e. anticipatory signal control and responsive signal control, are
considered.
Miller (1963) was the ﬁrst to introduce the notion of traﬃc-responsive control. In
traﬃc-responsive control, data collected from vehicle detectors located upstream is used to
optimize the signal settings.
The strand in the literature that deals with traﬃc-responsive signal control focuses
on the iterative optimization and assignment procedure. In the iterative optimization and
assignment procedure the signal settings and equilibrium ﬂow patterns are updated alter-
natively, until both ﬂows are at equilibrium and signal settings are optimal given the ﬂows
(Allsop and Charlesworth (1977), Cantarella et al. (1991), Gartner et al. (1980), Lee and
Hazelton (1996)).
In the case of anticipatory signal control the road authority anticipates the reaction of
the drivers to a change in the signal settings and thus optimizes the signal settings taking
into account the reaction of the drivers. In the literature, this has been formulated as a
bi-level problem, in which the upper level is the signal setting problem and the lower level
is the traﬃc equilibrium assignment problem (Chiou (1999), Yang and Yagar (1995)), and
as a Stackelberg game (Fisk (1984)).
A few papers have touched on the shortcomings of responsive signal control. Both
Gershwin and Tan (1978) and Dickson (1981) have solved the combined traﬃc assignment
and control problem for a speciﬁc numerical example, using on the one hand the iterative
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optimization and assignment procedure and on the other hand a constrained optimization
approach. For their speciﬁc examples, both show that the iterative optimization and as-
signment leads to a worse solution.
In this paper we use a game theoretical perspective to model both the anticipatory and
the responsive signal setting procedure for a simple network. This results in clear theoretical
results, which allow to give insights in the underlying mechanisms. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows: First, the problem at hand is described in Section
2. Subsequently, the outcomes of the traﬃc-responsive and anticipatory framework are
compared and discussed in Section 3. Section 4, ﬁnally, oﬀers a conclusion.
3.2 Problem formulation
The model we use to compare the performance of anticipatory signal control with the per-
formance of traﬃc-responsive signal control is the simple two-road model represented in
Figure 3.1. We assume that, per time unit, N people want to go from A to B.1 Further-
more, we limit the model to undersaturated traﬃc conditions, i.e. queues at the intersection
are only created during the red phases and dissolved during the green phases. To go from
A to B, drivers can either take a congestible route (Route 1) or an uncongestible route
(Route 2).2 In this paper, the red phase on Route 2 is represented by `r', and will be the
main control variable. The corresponding green phase on Route 2 will thus be `c-r', and
a reverse scenario holds for Route 1. The duration of the sum of the red and the green
phase is the cycle time `c', which, to simplify matters, is held ﬁxed. Hence, it follows that
including intergreen time in the analysis is not relevant and will thus be ignored.
As there will be alternating red times to avoid collisions at the intersection, drivers on
both routes will experience an expected traﬃc light waiting time cost (T1 (c, r) , T2 (c, r)).
It is clear that the expected traﬃc light waiting cost functions are increasing in the red
time and decreasing in the green time (∂T1(c,r)∂r < 0,
∂T2(c,r)
∂r > 0). Assuming undersaturated
1The arrival rate is thus inelastic, static and deterministic.
2Up to N drivers per hour, the time cost curve for this route is horizontal.
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Figure 3.1: Outline of an intersection of two routes connecting one OD pair (AB) regulated by
traﬃc lights.
traﬃc conditions, the expected traﬃc light functions take the following form for 0 < r < c:3
T1 (c, r) =
(c− r)2
2c
(3.1)
T2 (c, r) =
r2
2c
(3.2)
When it is always red (r = c for Route 2 and r = 0 for Route 1 ) the expected traﬃc
light waiting function jumps to inﬁnity.
We will model both the anticipatory and the traﬃc-responsive control and assignment
problem as a Stackelberg game (Von Stackelberg (1934)). The Stackelberg game is a se-
quential game in which the leader moves ﬁrst and the follower acts sequentially. In this
paper, the traﬃc authority is the leader when the signal control is anticipatory and the
traﬃc authority is the follower when the signal control is traﬃc-responsive. The objective
of the traﬃc authority is to maximize welfare. The drivers in turn represent the follower
when the signal control is anticipatory and the leader when the signal control is traﬃc-
responsive. We will assume that all drivers are identical and try to minimize their expected
travel cost.
The behaviour of the drivers can also be represented as a game, because the congestion
on one road is dependent upon how many users choose to use the same road. In this paper,
we will assume that the drivers behave non-cooperatively (Nash (1951)).
3We will assume that the saturation ﬂow rate g is very large in comparison to the arrival rate Xi, so
that the traﬃc light waiting time due to departure delay is negligible.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Traﬃc-responsive signal control
When the signal control is traﬃc-responsive, the signal settings respond to the current traf-
ﬁc conditions measured by a vehicle detector. This situation is represented as a Stackelberg
game in Figure 3.2. The game tree shows all the possible distributions of the drivers over
the two routes and all the policies the government can implement in reaction to the drivers'
choice.
Figure 3.2: Total costs when signal control is traﬃc-responsive.
To predict the outcome of this game, we will ﬁrst determine the best response of the
road authority to every possible distribution of the drivers over the two routes. Assuming
that the government wants to maximize welfare, their best response to any distribution over
the two routes is to maximize welfare taking as given this distribution. From the game tree,
it is clear that the traﬃc authority will always give green to Route 1 when all drivers choose
Route 1. When all drivers choose Route 2, the rational decision for the traﬃc authority
is to give always green to Route 2. When the drivers divide themselves over the 2 routes,
the optimal response of the traﬃc authority is the solution of the following optimization
problem.
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min
r
(a1X1 + ω + φ1 + T1 (r))X1 + (ω + φ2 + T2 (r))X2 (3.3)
0 < r < c (3.4)
In this optimization problem ai represents the sensitivity to congestion of route i, Xi
equals the ﬂow on route i,4 φi stands for the minimal time cost of route i, ω is the resource
cost for a trip from A to C on either route and Ti (c, r) is the expected waiting time cost
on route i at the intersection.
Taking the derivative of (3.3) to r and taking into account that X1+X2 = N , we ﬁnd
that the optimal strategy for the government is to implement the following red time:
r∗ =
X1c
N
(3.5)
Making this trip day in day out, the drivers will come to learn the optimization formula
of the government, which is easy to understand as the red time is inversely proportional to
the ﬂow. As a result, their private cost functions have the following form for 0 < X1 < N :
a1X1 + φ1 + ω +
cX22
2N2
(3.6)
for Route 1 and
φ2 + ω +
cX21
2N2
(3.7)
for Route 2. Remark that cX
2
2
2N2
is the expected traﬃc light waiting cost for Route 1 ( (c−r
∗)2
2c ,
with r∗ = X1cN ) and
cX21
2N2
is the expected traﬃc light waiting cost for Route 2 ( r
∗2
2c , with
r∗ = X1cN ).
Drivers will individually seek to minimize their private cost and will consequently
change routes until unilaterally changing increases their private cost. At that point the
stationary distribution of vehicles in the network, i.e. the equilibrium, is reached. And this
stationary distribution will thus be the outcome of the drivers' part of the game which,
together with the government's strategy, will determine the total cost of responsive signal
control.
Remark that, even though the signal setting policy of the traﬃc authority provides
the drivers with an opportunity to manage the actions of the traﬃc authority, they can not
4This is the ﬂow measured by the vehicle detector.
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exploit this advantage as the drivers do not cooperate.
Depending on the parameter values and the amount of drivers on Route 1, the average
cost curve is either downward sloping (dAC1dX1 < 0) or upward sloping (
dAC1
dX1
> 0). The
average cost on Route 1 can be downward sloping because an increase in volume on Route
1 implies a decrease in volume on Route 2. With responsive signals this implies a longer
green phase on Route 1 which can outweight the increased congestion on Route 1. In this
paper, we will determine the equilibria for only one instance: the waiting cost always out-
weights the congestion cost (∀X1 : dAC1dX1 < 0). We can restrict ourselves to this instance,
as it suﬃces to show the superiority of anticipatory control.
When the waiting cost outweights the congestion cost for all possible distributions of
vehicles over the two routes, we can distinguish between three cases: either the average cost
of Route 1 is always larger than the average cost of Route 2 or the other way around, or
the average cost curves intersect. We will determine the equilibria for each of these cases
separately.
Case 1. If for every distribution of vehicles over the two routes AC1 is larger than
AC2, then the only equilibrium is X2 = N .
Figure 3.3: The only stationary distribution is X2 = N
The search for potential equilibria in the set of possible distributions of vehicles over
the 2 routes is greatly simpliﬁed by Wardrop's ﬁrst principle (Wardrop (1952)): In a user
equilibrium, all used routes for an OD pair should have equal generalized prices, and there
are no unused routes with lower generalized prices. For this case, the ﬁrst part of the
principle, eliminates all distributions in which both routes are used. The second part of the
principle, eliminates the outcome where all drivers are on Route 1. The only distribution
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left, X2 = N , satisﬁes the deﬁnition of a Nash equilibrium. The total cost in this case
equals (ω + φ2)N .
Case 2. If there exists a distribution of vehicles over the two routes for which AC1 =
AC2, then there are two potential equilibria: X2 = N or X1 = N .
Figure 3.4: There are two stationary distributions: X2 = N and X1 = N
In this case, Wardrop's ﬁrst principle leaves us with three potential equilibria: X2 = N ,
X1 = N , and X1 =
( c2+φ1−φ2)N
c−a1N . When the distribution of vehicles is such that the average
cost of both routes is the same, then a driver on Route 1 could lower his cost by unilaterally
changing to Route 2 (or a driver on Route 2 could lower his cost by unilaterally changing
to Route 1). So depending on the initial distribution of vehicles over the two routes, either
X2 = N or X1 = N will be the stationary distribution. The corresponding total cost equals
(ω + φ2)N when the equilibrium is X2 = N and (a1N + ω + φ1)N when X1 = N .
Case 3. If for every distribution of vehicles over the two routes AC2 is larger than
AC1, then the only equilibrium is X1 = N .
If for every possible distribution of vehicles over the two routes, the private cost when
taking Route 2 is higher than the private cost of taking Route 1, then all drivers will take
Route 1. This dominant strategy leads us to the equilibrium distribution X1 = N . The
private cost every driver will incur equals a1N + ω + φ1, and the total cost thus amounts
to (a1N + ω + φ1)N .
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Figure 3.5: The only stationary distribution is X1 = N
3.3.2 Anticipatory signal control
When signal control is anticipatory, the traﬃc authority moves ﬁrst and bases its decision
on the expected reaction of the drivers. Figure 3.6 shows the diﬀerent options for the gov-
ernment, and the possible reactions of the drivers.
Figure 3.6: Total costs when signal control is anticipatory.
The traﬃc authority has three possible policies: to grant always green to Route 1, to
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grant always green to Route 2, or to implement an alternating signal setting.5 The users in
turn can react in three diﬀerent ways to any chosen policy: to only take Route 1, to only
use Route 2, or to use both routes.
If the traﬃc authority decides to implement always red for Route 1, then all drivers
will take Route 2 and the total cost will equal (ω + φ2)N . If, on the other hand, the traﬃc
authority grants always green to Route 1, then the user equilibrium will be X1 = N and
the total cost will be (a1N + ω + φ1)N . If, however, the government decides to implement
an alternating signal setting, the equilibrium reaction of the drivers will be X1 = N if
a1N + φ1 + T1 (c, r) < φ2 + T2 (c, r), and X2 = N if φ1 + T1 (c, r) > φ2 + T2 (c, r). If
φ1 + T1 (c, r) < φ2 + T2 (c, r) < a1N + φ1 + T1 (c, r), the drivers will use both routes, and
the Wardrop equilibrium implies (ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r))N as total cost.
A glance at Figure 3.6 reveals that a rational government will never decide on an
alternating signal setting when both routes are substitutes. Indeed, let Ti (c, r) be the
expected waiting time cost on route i at the intersection. As Ti (c, r) is positive when
0 < r < c, the total travel cost for an alternating signal setting will always be higher than
for r = c or r = 0. Which of the two non-alternating signal settings will be optimal depends
on the values of the parameters a1, N, φ1 and φ2. Whenever a1N + φ1 < φ2, r = c is the
optimal solution and whenever a1N + φ1 ≥ φ2, r = 0 will be implemented.
3.3.3 Anticipatory versus traﬃc-responsive signal control
From the analysis in Section 3.3.2, we know that when a1N + φ1 < φ2, the total cost
amounts to (a1N + ω + φ1)N and when a1N + φ1 ≥ φ2, the total cost equals (ω + φ2)N
when traﬃc control is anticipatory. The outcome in each of the two scenarios is not so
straightforward in case traﬃc-responsive control is implemented,6 so it is rather cumber-
some to directly compare total costs. However, the following line of reasoning allows to
asses the relative performance of anticipatory and traﬃc-responsive control in an indirect
way.
Comparing the outcomes of anticipatory signal control (Figure 3.6) to the possible
outcomes of traﬃc responsive signal control (Figure 3.2), it is clear that the performance
5The third branch, representing the decision of the government to implement an alternating signal setting
(0 < r < c), is a clubbing of all red times between zero and c.
6As it depends on the relative values of some of the parameters.
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of traﬃc responsive signal control can only be equally well or worse than anticipatory sig-
nal control. Consequently, if there exists one case for which the performance of traﬃc
responsive signal control is worse, we can conclude that the overall expected perfomance of
traﬃc-responsive signal control is worse than anticipatory signal control.
Take the scenario in which a1N + φ1 < φ2, then out of the three cases we have dealt
with in section 3.3.1, Case 2 and Case 3 can occur. If Case 2 occurs the total cost is either
(a1N + ω + φ1)N or (ω + φ2)N . If Case 3 occurs, the total cost is (a1N + ω + φ1)N .
Remember that in this case the total cost with anticipatory signal control equals
(a1N + ω + φ1)N . The possible outcome of the stationary distribution X2 = N , resulting
in a signal setting r = 0 and total cost (ω + φ2)N , when a1N + φ1 < φ2 thus proves that
there exists at least one case for which the performance of traﬃc responsive signal control
is worse than the performance of anticipatory signal control. As a result, we can assert that
for our model, the performance of anticipatory signal control is superior to the performance
of traﬃc-responsive signal control.
This result can be explained by recognizing the presence of externalities and the ﬁrst
mover advantage. Because of externalities, the drivers' individual choices are not socially
optimal. Or, putting it diﬀerently, every driver minimizes his own cost, but this does not
necessarily minimize the cost of all drivers. The traﬃc authority's objective is to minimize
the cost of all drivers, so its unconstrained decisions are socially optimal. However, in both
the traﬃc responsive control problem and the anticipatory control problem the traﬃc au-
thority's optimization problem is constrained, to a greater or lesser extent, by the behaviour
of the drivers. When the traﬃc authority is the leader, she can act so as to elicit the most
favorable response of the driver. However, when the traﬃc authority is the follower, her
inﬂuence on the drivers' behaviour is more restricted. Analytically, when signal control
is anticipatory the leader's optimization problem is constrained by the drivers' reaction
function, while when signal control is traﬃc-responsive the leader's optimization problem is
constrained by the drivers' individually optimized distribution over the diﬀerent routes. It
is clear that the traﬃc authority's constraint is much more restricting when signal control
is traﬃc-responsive. This also becomes apparent in Figure 3.7 below, in which the total
cost is compared in case the traﬃc authority is the leader and when the traﬃc authority is
the follower.
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of the total cost when traﬃc control is anticipatory and traﬃc-responsive
for an interior equilibrium.
When both routes are used in equilibrium, the anticipatory signal setting will always
be the lowest red time possible (on Route 2), resulting in the lowest costs (see red arrow
in Figure 3.7). However, when signal control is responsive, the equilibrium signal setting
equals r = (
φ2−φ1− c2
a1N−c )c, which, depending on the parameter values, results in a total cost
that is at least as high as the lowest cost.
Our discussion allows to extend the obtained results to other networks. Indeed, the
above reasoning can be applied as well to other situations in which signal settings can in-
ﬂuence route choice. If there is no route choice, then the traﬃc-responsive control coincides
with anticipatory control.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that for an intersection of two routes connecting one OD pair
where only one route is subject to congestion (1) traﬃc responsive signal control can only
perform just as well or worse than anticipatory signal control and that (2) the expected per-
formance of traﬃc responsive signal control is worse than the performance of anticipatory
signal control. The game theoretic perspective taken in this paper furthermore suggests
that these results can also be extended to larger instances.
These results have important implications for policy. The counter-intuitiveness of these
results indicates that great attention needs to be given to the accuracy of the appraisal of
signal control investments. Since both the costs of road transportation infrastructure and
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user costs are large, policy should be based on careful analysis rather than on intuition
alone. The allocation of public money to the intuitively superior traﬃc-responsive signal
control, may actually make society worse oﬀ as the money could be more eﬃciently spent on
anticipatory signal control. This paper furthermore intends to raise awareness that policies
based on intuition alone can have unintended consequences in the hope that these can be
recognized and avoided.
A ﬁnal note on the results in this paper concerns the deterministic nature of demand
in this paper. An interesting extension would deal with stochastic demand as the ﬂexi-
ble nature of traﬃc-responsive signal control could mitigate the advantage of anticipatory
control in this case.
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Chapter 4
Can traﬃc lights achieve the same
results as tolls?
4.1 Introduction
One of the main constraints in the optimization of networks is the socially suboptimal
behavior of drivers. This suboptimal behavior manifests itself in an excessive amount of
drivers on the road, or in an ineﬃcient distribution of vehicles over alternative routes. In
this paper, the focus will solely be on this second type of ineﬃciency.
The main reason behind this ineﬃciency is a congestion externality often present in
transportation. As drivers do not take into account their delaying eﬀect on other users
when making a decision about which road to take, an ineﬃcient situation arises.
The solution proposed by Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) is to internalize the ex-
ternality by introducing road pricing. Travellers are then confronted with their marginal
social cost, rather than their average cost, and will consequently make the socially optimal
route choice. This paper analyzes the conditions under which traﬃc lights can provide an
adequate alternative to road pricing.
The suggestion for traﬃc lights as an alternative to road pricing is based on the ob-
servation that traﬃc lights have the potential to inﬂuence route choice.
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Already in 1974, Allsop pointed out that signal settings can aﬀect route choice. A
change in the signal settings inﬂuences the average cost of the routes, leading to a change
in route choice. This insight has generated two approaches in the literature to optimize
a network with traﬃc lights: (1) the iterative procedure and (2) the global optimization
approach (Cantarella et al. (1991)).
The iterative procedure iteratively solves the signal setting problem for a ﬁxed ﬂow
pattern and the assignment problem for ﬁxed signal settings until two successive ﬂow pat-
terns or signal settings converge (Allsop and Charlesworth (1977), Gartner et al. (1980),
Cantarella et al. (1991)).
When the global optimization approach is applied, some network objective function is
optimized while taking into account the equilibrium route choice behaviour of the drivers.
The global optimization problem can be modelled as a bilevel programming problem (Yang
and Yagar (1995)) or as a Stackelberg game (Fisk (1984)).
Compared to the iterative approach, the Stackelberg approach enables the traﬃc au-
thority to exert more control over the equilibrium route choice of the drivers. As this paper
aims at using traﬃc lights to inﬂuence route choice, applying the Stackelberg approach
seems the logical choice.
First, we will model the signal setting procedure as a Stackelberg game. In a later
stage, we will use the inverse Stackelberg approach (Olsder (2009)), which is an extension
of the basic Stackelberg game. In the basic Stackelberg game the leader chooses an action
after which the follower determines his optimal response. In the inverse Stackelberg game
the leader action is generalized from making a direct decision to determining a function
that maps the followers' decision space into the leader's decision space. As such, the in-
verse Stackelberg approach allows to fully control the route choice behaviour of the drivers.
The following example, adopted from Groot et al. (2012), illustrates the inverse Stack-
elberg concept.
Example 1. Consider the following simple static, single-leader single-follower situation.
Let the objective functions of leader and follower be respectively:
JL (uL, uF ) = (uF − 5)2 + u2L,
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JF (uL, uF ) = u
2
L + u
2
F − uLuF ,
with decision variables uL ∈ <, uF ∈ <. The leader's global optimum is
(
udL, u
d
F
)
= (0, 5).
In the original Stackelberg game formulation, the follower's response to the desired variable
udL = 0 would be the suboptimal u
∗
F = 1/2uL = 0.
However, under the leader function
uL = γL (uF ) = 2uF − 10,
the follower's response will be:
argmin
uF
JF (uF ) = argmin
uF
(2uF − 10)2 + u2F + (2uF − 10)uF = 5.
We focus our analysis on two diﬀerent types of networks, one in which the traﬃc
lights' primary objective is to regulate an intersection and another network in which traﬃc
lights are installed with as a sole objective to inﬂuence route choice. Both networks are
deliberately kept as simple as possible to allow for clear, intuitive results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 4.2 the diﬀerent net-
works are described. In Section 4.3 the relative performance of road pricing and traﬃc
lights is compared for the network with two parallel routes. In Section 4.4, we focus on the
network in which the main purpose of the traﬃc lights is to avoid collisions. Section 4.5
oﬀers a discussion and Section 4.6 concludes this paper.
4.2 Basic set-up: network, demand, equilibrium conditions
Per time unit N users wish to travel from a single origin (A) to a single destination (B).
The drivers can choose between two alternative routes indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. Let f1 (f2) be
the minimum travel time from A to B via Route 1 (Route 2). Both routes are congestible,
and the congestion is represented by a the variable travel time that is an increasing linear
function of the number of users, Xi, on this route. The route's sensitivity to congestion is
denoted by ai.
In this paper, we distinguish between two diﬀerent networks of two routes connecting
an origin A to a destination B. In the ﬁrst network (Figure 4.1) the capacity of road CB
is such that the merge of Route 1 and Route 2 drivers can occur without hindrance. In
that case, no additional cost is incurred at point C and the average cost when using Route
i equals:
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Figure 4.1: A network without intersection
ACi = fi + aiXi (4.1)
In the second network (Figure 4.2) the intersection is regulated by traﬃc lights. In
that case, the two routes can not have simultaneous right of way, and the drivers on both
routes will experience an expected traﬃc light waiting time cost (T1 (c, r) , T2 (c, r)).
Figure 4.2: A network with an intersection
The average cost on Route i is given by the sum of the ﬁxed and variable time cost
and the expected waiting time cost at the traﬃc light (Ti(r, c)):
ACi = fi + aiXi + Ti(r, c) (4.2)
In this paper, r2 is the red time for Route 2. The duration of the sum of the red
and the green phase is the cycle time `c', which, to simplify matters, is held ﬁxed. Hence,
it follows that including intergreen time in the analysis is not relevant and will thus be
ignored. The red time for Route 1 will be (c− r2).
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It is clear that the expected traﬃc light waiting cost functions are increasing in the
red time and decreasing in the green time (∂T1(c,r2)∂r2 < 0,
∂T2(c,r2)
∂r2
> 0). When it is always
red (r2 = c for Route 2 and r2 = 0 for Route 1) the expected traﬃc light waiting cost is
inﬁnitely high. For simplicity, we will assume that the queue that builds up during the red
time fully dissipates during the green time and that the cost associated with it is negligible.
In that case the expected traﬃc light functions take the following form for 0 < r2 < c:
T1 (c, r2) =
(c− r2)2
2c
(4.3)
T2 (c, r2) =
r22
2c
(4.4)
All drivers are assumed identical and try to minimize their expected travel cost. The
equilibrium concept used in this paper is known as the user equilibrium. It was introduced
by Bernstein and Smith (1994) and used by e.g. De Palma and Nesterov (1998). In the
user equilibrium no arbitrarily small portion of drivers on a route can lower its private
cost by deviating to another route that connects the same origin destination pair.1 When
the private cost functions are continuous, the user equilibrium reduces to the Wardrop
equilibrium (Wardrop (1952)). With two routes, the Wardrop equilibrium has either all
drivers on Route 1, or all drivers on Route 2, or a distribution of drivers over the two routes
such that the average cost on both routes is equal.
4.3 A network without intersection
In this section, the focus is on a network in which traﬃc lights are not strictly necessary, in
the sense that there are no conﬂicting traﬃc streams. We ﬁrst determine the minimal total
cost when route choice is inﬂuenced by road pricing (Section 4.3.1). In this same section,
we also work out the minimum cost when traﬃc lights are used to inﬂuence route choice
(Section 4.3.2). In both sections, the optimization process is modelled as a Stackelberg
game in which the traﬃc authority is the leader and the drivers are the follower. In Section
4.3.3 the diﬀerent policies are compared.
Proposition 7. In a network with two parallel routes, a traﬃc light with an optimal signal
setting determined by the Stackelberg game can not provide an adequate alternative for road
pricing.
1See Section 4.4.2 for a formal deﬁnition.
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4.3.1 Road pricing to inﬂuence route choice
When demand is inelastic, the ineﬃciency caused by the socially suboptimal behaviour of
drivers only manifests itself in a socially suboptimal route-choice. Therefore, a toll or a
subsidy on only one of the two routes suﬃces to account for this suboptimality, even when
both routes are congested (see Appendix H).
For the network in Figure 4.1, we will assume that a toll is levied on Route 1. The
total cost for this network then equals the sum of the average cost of all Route 1 and Route
2-drivers minus the toll revenue, i.e. (a1X1 + f1 + τ)X1 + (a2X2 + f2)X2 − τX1. The
minimization of this cost through road pricing has two stages. First the traﬃc authority
determines the toll value. Second, the drivers make their route choice. To ﬁnd the optimal
toll value, we work backward.
Depending on the toll value, the Wardrop equilibrium2 will either be X1 = N , X2 = N
or 0 < X1 < N such that the average cost is equal on both routes. Suppose the traﬃc au-
thority implements τ , then all drivers will take Route 1 in equilibrium if a1N +f1+ τ < f2.
The total cost then equals (f1 + a1N)N . If a2N + f2 < f1 + τ all drivers will take Route
2 in equilibrium and the total cost is (f2 + a2N)N . Finally, if the value of τ is such that
a1N+f1+τ > f2 and a2N+f2 < f1+τ then the drivers will distribute themselves over the
two routes, resulting in a total cost of
(
f1 +
a1(a2N+f2−f1)
a1+a2
+ a2τa1+a2
)
N − τXe1 (Appendix
I).
Traﬃc
authority Drivers
(
f1 +
a1(a2N+f2−f1)
a1+a2
+ a2τa1+a2
)
N − τXe1
0 < X
1 < N
(f1 + a1N)N
X1 = N
(f2 + a2N)N
X2
= N
τ
Figure 4.3: Total costs when road pricing is applied
Taking into account the equilibrium behaviour of the drivers, the traﬃc authority
2Both equation (4.1) and (4.2) are continuous in Xi and so the equilibrium distribution of vehicles will
be a Wardrop equilibrium.
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determines the optimal τ -value. Figure 4.3 shows that the total cost is not aﬀected
by the toll value when all drivers take one route in equilibrium. So if (f1 + a1N)N
((f2 + a2N)N) is the lowest cost, a rational traﬃc authority will implement a toll that
satisﬁes a1N + f1 + τ < f2 (a2N + f2 < f1 + τ).
When a1N + f1 + τ > f2 and a2N + f2 > f1 + τ , the drivers will use both routes. In
this case, the toll value inﬂuences the total cost, and the total cost is minimized when the
toll value equals f2−f12 .
It can be shown that if the optimal toll value is feasible,3 then the associated minimal
cost is lower than (f1 + a1N)N and (f2 + a2N)N . It can furthermore be shown that if
τ = f2−f12 is such that X
e
1 < 0 (X
e
1 > N), (a2N + f2)N ((a1N + f1)N) is the lowest cost
and the equilibrium distribution is X2 = N (X1 = N) when τ =
f2−f1
2 is implemented.
Thus, independently of the parameter values, the optimal policy for the traﬃc authority
would always be to set the toll equal to f2−f12 .
4.3.2 Traﬃc lights to inﬂuence route choice
Consider the network in Figure 4.4 in which, instead of road pricing, a traﬃc light is
installed on Route 1 to inﬂuence route choice.
Figure 4.4: A traﬃc light to inﬂuence route choice
Suppose the authority implements the signal setting r1. Then the equilibrium distri-
bution will be X1 = N when f2 > a1N+f1+T1, X2 = N f1+T1 > a2N+f2 and the drivers
will use both routes in the equilibrium when f2 ≤ a1N + f1 + T1 and f1 + T1 ≤ a2N + f2.
3That is, if for the optimal toll value the equilibrium amount of drivers on Route 1 and Route 2 is
positive.
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Traﬃc
authority Drivers
(
f1 +
a1(a2N+f2−f1)
a1+a2
+ a2T1a1+a2
)
N
0 < X
1 < N
(f1 + a1N + T1)N
X1 = N
(f2 + a2N)N
X2
= N
T1
Figure 4.5: Total costs when a traﬃc light is installed
If all drivers take Route 1, the total cost can be minimized by setting the traﬃc light
always to green. The total cost then equals (a1N + f1)N . If all drivers take Route 2
in equilibrium, the total cost will be (f2 + a2N)N . When both routes are used in the
equilibrium, the total cost is minimal for T1 = 0,4 as illustrated in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: The total cost is minimal when the traﬃc light is always green.
If T1 = 0, the total cost equals area ABCD. If a traﬃc light is installed on Route 1
4The cost decrease resulting from a better route choice is outweighted by the cost increase due to the
additional waiting time.
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and the expected traﬃc light waiting cost is positive, then the average cost curve of Route
1 will shift up (the grey curve in Figure 4.6). The total cost will then equal the area AEFD,
which is larger than the area ABCD. Given that the average cost curve of Route 2 is upward
sloping, it is clear that any T1 > 0 will result in a higher total cost than T1 = 0.
Figure 4.7: The cost minimizing user equilibrium always comes about.
To obtain the lowest cost, the reaction of the drivers to the optimal signal setting also
has to be such that the cost minimizing user equilibrium comes about. In Figure 4.7, the
three possible scenarios, dependent on the parameter settings, are depicted. In the ﬁrst
graph, the situation in which (a1N + f1)N is the lowest cost is represented. It is clear from
the graph that X1 = N will always be the Wardrop equilibrium in this case. In the middle
graph the parameter values are such that
(
f1 +
a1(a2N+f2−f1)
a1+a2
)
N is the lowest cost. In this
case, both routes are used in equilibrium. In the graph on the right (f2 + a2N)N is the
lowest cost. Here, X2 = N is the user equilibrium.
Remark ﬁnally, that even though the optimal signal setting for all cases in this section
is to give always green, we can not conclude that installing a traﬃc light solely to inﬂuence
route choice can not be a good policy.5 Indeed, a well placed traﬃc light can sidestep
the Braess paradox (Braess (1968)). In the Braess paradox adding a road to a congested
network can increase overall journey time. Consider the network in Figure 4.8 in which the
addition of link v-t increases the total social cost. The installation of a traﬃc light on link
v-t in the network (b) in Figure 4.8 thus allows to lower total costs.
5I am indebted to André de Palma for pointing this out to me.
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Figure 4.8: Braess' paradox
4.3.3 Policy comparison: minimum costs and ﬂexibility of the instru-
ments
In Table 4.1 the minimal costs that can be obtained with the diﬀerent instruments are
summarized. The minimal cost that can be obtained when all the drivers take Route 1 is
the same for both instruments. When (f1 + a1N)N is the lowest cost, the traﬃc authority
can attain this lowest cost both with a traﬃc light and with a toll.
Table 4.1: The total travel cost for each user equilibrium and policy measure
X1 = N X2 = N 0 < X1 < N
τ (f1 + a1N)N (f2 + a2N)N
−
(
f1−f2
2
)2
+a2f1N+a1f2N+a1a2N2
a1+a2
T1 (f1 + a1N)N (f2 + a2N)N
a1a2N2+a1f2N+a2f1N
a1+a2
The minimal cost that can be obtained by directing all drivers to Route 2 is equal in
both cases. Both instruments are equally ﬂexible in directing the traﬃc towards this user
equilibrium. Consequently, if the parameter values are such that (f2 + a2N)N is the lowest
cost, then both instruments can always attain the lowest cost in the network.
If in the user equilibrium the drivers distribute themselves over the two routes, then the
total cost when road pricing is applied is at least as low as when a traﬃc light is installed.
Indeed, a1a2N
2+a1f2N+a2f1N
a1+a2
−
(
f1−f2
2
)2
a1+a2
≤ a1a2N2+a1f2N+a2f1Na1+a2 . This result is intuitive. A
62
CHAPTER 4. CAN TRAFFIC LIGHTS ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULTS AS TOLLS?
traﬃc light can aﬀect route choice, but any intervention comes at a cost, namely the waiting
cost at the traﬃc light. A toll can also aﬀect route choice, but, as the toll revenue ﬂows
back to society, the toll is not a cost. Combining these insights with the knowledge that
the optimal toll can always direct the drivers towards the lowest cost equilibrium, it can be
concluded that road pricing performs better than traﬃc lights.
4.4 A network with intersection
In this section, the focus is on a network in which a traﬃc light is essential for reasons of
traﬃc safety. For this network, we ﬁrst determine the minimal cost that can be attained
when road pricing is applied in conjunction with traﬃc lights (Section 4.4.1). Subsequently,
we compare these results with the minimal costs obtained when road pricing can not be
implemented and only ﬁxed signal settings are possible (Section 4.4.2). Next, we determine
the conditions the signal settings have to satisfy to obtain the same results as road pricing.
Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed
methodology.
Proposition 8. In a network with two parallel routes that intersect, a traﬃc light with an
optimal signal setting determined by an inverse Stackelberg game can provide an adequate
alternative for road pricing.
4.4.1 The optimal solution when road pricing is applied
We will model the signal and toll setting procedure for the network in Figure 4.9 as a
Stackelberg game.
The traﬃc authority who controls the signal settings and toll, can either give always
green to Route 1, or give always green to Route 2 or implement an alternating signal set-
ting. The toll is levied on Route 1, and can be positive or negative. In deciding upon his
optimal control (optimal in the sense that it minimizes total cost), the traﬃc authority will
take into account the reaction of the drivers. The drivers can react to a certain signal and
toll-combination by taking all together Route 1, or Route 2, or dividing themselves over
the two routes in equilibrium.
If r2 = 0, the Wardrop equilibrium is X2 = N . As a consequence, all combinations
of variables for which r2 = 0 and 0 < X1 ≤ N are not part of the feasible set. Following
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Figure 4.9: Road pricing applied to a network with an intersection
the same reasoning, if r2 = c the only feasible ﬂow variable is X1 = N . As road pricing
does not aﬀect the objective function, the value of the objective function will be the same
for solutions (r2 = c, X1 = N , τ > 0) and (r2 = c, X1 = N , τ = 0) and for solutions
(r2 = 0, X2 = N , τ > 0) and (r2 = 0, X2 = N , τ = 0). Given that the implementation of
road pricing is costly6only the candidate solutions (r2 = 0, X2 = N , τ = 0) and (r2 = c,
X1 = N , τ = 0) are retained.
For 0 < r2 < c, the objective function will only be lower than the objective function of
the two previous candidate solutions if 0 < X1 < N.7 As a consequence, the third candidate
solution will be the solution of the following minimization problem.
min
r,X1,X2,τ
(f1 + a1X1 + T1 (c, r2) + τ)X1 + (f2 + a2X2 + T2 (c, r2))X2 − τX1 (4.5)
s.t.
f1 + a1X1 + T1 (c, r2) + τ = f2 + a2X2 + T2 (c, r2) (4.6)
X1 +X2 = N (4.7)
X1 > 0 (4.8)
X2 > 0 (4.9)
r2 > 0 (4.10)
r2 < c (4.11)
6For simplicity, this has not been included in the objective function.
7Indeed, for a signal setting r ∈ ]0, c[, (f1 + a1N + T1 (c, r2))N is always larger than (f1 + a1N)N and
(f2 + a2N + T2 (c, r2))N is always larger than (f2 + a2N)N .
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Figure 4.10: Total costs when road pricing is applied in conjunction with traﬃc lights
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In this optimization problem ai represents the sensitivity to congestion of route i, Xi
equals the ﬂow on route i, fi stands for the minimal time and resource cost of route i, τ
is the value of the toll levied on Route 1 and Ti(c, r2) is the expected waiting time cost on
route i at the intersection.
For simplicity we will assume that the parameter values are such that the total cost
function is convex (2 (a1 + a2)N − c ≥ 0). Then the solution of this minimization problem
is the global minimum. Furthermore, we will assume that the parameter values are such
that 0 < r∗2 < c.
Solving the ﬁrst order conditions of the Langragian function associated with this opti-
mization problem, yields the optimal ﬂow pattern, toll value and signal setting (Appendix
K). The optimal distribution of vehicles (Xint) can be found where the marginal cost curves
of both routes intersect:
f1 + 2a1X1 + T1 (c, r2) = f2 + 2a2X2 + T2 (c, r2) (4.12)
The optimal toll (τ int) equals the diﬀerence between the marginal external congestion cost
of Route 1 and the marginal external congestion cost of Route 2.
τ = a1X1 − a2X2 (4.13)
The optimal signal setting (rint2 ) is determined by the following equation:
δT1 (c, r2)
δr2
X1 = −δT2 (c, r2)
δr2
X2 (4.14)
It can be shown that there exist parameter values for which the interior solution is
feasible and the associated total cost (TCint) is lower than (a1N + f1)N and (a2N + f2).
As a consequence, the interior solution is a candidate solution.
Depending on the parameter values, the desired choice for the traﬃc authority will
thus be one of the three following combinations: either Route 1 always has green, no toll is
levied and all drivers take Route 1 or Route 2 receives always green, no toll is levied and
all drivers take Route 2 or the optimal alternating signal setting (rint2 ) is implemented, the
optimal toll (τ int) is levied and the drivers are distributed over the two routes such that
MC1 =MC2.
66
CHAPTER 4. CAN TRAFFIC LIGHTS ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULTS AS TOLLS?
The total costs associated with these solutions are the lowest attainable in this network
if there are to be N drivers per time unit going from A to B. The network itself is indeed only
restricted by the fact that the signal settings have to be such that collisions are avoided.
The lowest costs for the network are thus associated with the solutions of the following
optimization problem
min
r2,X1
(f1 + a1X1 + T1 (c, r2))X1 + (f2 + a2 (N −X1) + T2 (c, r2)) (N −X1) (4.15)
s.t.
0 ≤ X1 ≤ N (4.16)
0 ≤ r2 ≤ c (4.17)
An inspection of the corner solutions already provides two candidate optima: (r2 =
c,X1 = N) and (r2 = 0, X1 = 0). The total cost associated with these solutions is
(a1N + f1)N and (a2N + f2)N respectively. The third candidate solution is the interior
solution (0 < r2 < c and 0 < X1 < N). In Appendix K it is shown that the ﬂow pattern
of the optimal interior solution (X∗1 ) is determined by MC1 = MC2. Remark that when
the optimal toll is levied, the ﬂow distribution equals the socially optimal ﬂow pattern.
This implies that, for this network, road pricing allows to completely control route choice.
The optimal interior signal setting (r∗2) is determined by
dT1(c,r2)
dr2
X1 = −dT2(c,r2)dr2 X2, which
equals equation (4.14). Given that X∗1 equals Xint1 , r∗2 is equal to rint2 and the toll value
does not aﬀect the value of the objective function, the total cost will equal TCint.
Suppose now that for the network in Figure 4.9, the toll cannot be levied anymore.
In the previous section, we found that the deployment of traﬃc lights increases costs, as
the delays caused by the traﬃc light are added to the social cost. However, contrary to the
network in Section 4.3, the traﬃc light is now part of the network. So the delays caused
by the traﬃc light are not added to the social cost, but are already part of the social cost
also when road pricing is applied. Would it for this network then be possible to obtain the
same result with traﬃc lights alone?
4.4.2 The optimal solution when road pricing can not be applied
Figure 4.11 shows the diﬀerent options for the traﬃc authority and the possible reactions of
the drivers when the signal setting procedure is modelled as a Stackelberg game. From Evers
and Proost (2015), we know that, depending on the parameter values, the minimal cost for
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Traﬃc
authority
Drivers
(a1(a2N+f2+T2(c,ralt2 ))+a2(T1(c,ralt2 )+f1))N
a1+a2
0 < X
1 < N
(a1N + f1 + T1
(
c, ralt2
)
)N
X1 = N
(a2N + f2 + T2
(
c, ralt2
)
)N
X2
= N
0
<
r
2 <
c
Drivers 0 < X
1 < N
(f1 + a1N)N
X1 = N
X2
= N
r2 = c
Drivers 0 < X
1 < c
X1 = N
(f2 + a2N)N
X2
= N
r 2
=
0
Figure 4.11: Total costs when traﬃc lights are the only instrument
the network is given by (a2N+f2)N , (a1N+f1)N or
(
2a1a2(a1+a2)N+2a1(a1+a2)(f2−f1)+a1a2c
(a1+a2)
22
+ f1
)
N .
The associated optimal signal settings are r2 = 0, r2 = c and r2 =
a2c
a1+a2
respectively.8
Given that we now have fewer instruments to solve the same problem, these results
will be equally as good or worse than when a toll was also available. The focus will be on
the conditions under which deviations occur and on the sources of these deviations.
When the parameter values are such that (a1N + f1)N is the lowest cost attainable
with road pricing, then the simple implementation of r2 = c allows to obtain the same
cost. When (a2N + f2)N is the minimum, then the signal setting r2 = 0 provides this
solution. When TCint is the minimal cost, then the strategy to obtain this cost is not so
8Remark that the optimal alternating signal setting r2 =
a2c
a1+a2
only equals r∗2 for those parameter
values for which the ﬂow that solves AC1 = AC2 also solves MC1 =MC2.
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straightforward. Indeed, when the traﬃc authority implements r2 = 0 or r2 = c, then the
total cost equals (a2N + f2)N respectively (a1N + f1)N . These costs are by assumption
larger than TCint. When the traﬃc authority implements the optimal alternating signal
setting r2 =
a2c
a1+a2
the minimal cost is also at least as large as TCint. Indeed, at the end
of Section 4.4.2 we have shown that TCint is equal to the value of the total cost associated
with the optimal interior solution of an unconstrained optimization problem. The minimal
cost associated with r2 =
a2c
a1+a2
is the solution of the exact same optimization problem, yet
constrained by the equilibrium reaction of the driver. This last observation indicates that
the real constraint in obtaining the lowest cost is the route choice of the drivers. If the
traﬃc authority could exert more control over the route choice of the drivers, the lowest cost
would be attainable. This insight prompts us to shift to an approach with more inﬂuence
over route choice to see whether this allows traﬃc lights to achieve the same results as tolls.
Compared to the Stackelberg approach, the inverse Stackelberg approach allows to
exert more control over the choices of the follower. Therefore, we will now model the signal
setting procedure for the network in Figure 4.9 as an inverse Stackelberg game.
Whereas in the basic Stackelberg game the traﬃc authority implements a ﬂow-independent
signal setting, in the inverse Stackelberg game the signal setting can be a function of the
ﬂow pattern. In the following, we will determine what this function should look like to
obtain the lowest cost.9
We know that when (f1 + a1N)N ((f2 + a2N)N) is the lowest cost, the signal setting
r2 = c (r2 = 0 respectively) allows to obtain this minimum cost. A constant function thus
suﬃces in these cases. However, we also have shown that when TCint is the lowest cost a
ﬂow-independent signal setting is not suﬃcient. In fact, to reach TCint the signal setting
policy has to be such that when rint2 is set, the user equilibrium that comes about coincides
with the system equilibrium. The constraints a valid function has to satisfy thus depend
on the properties of the user equilibrium. We therefore ﬁrst give a formal deﬁnition of the
user equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. A feasible ﬂow pattern fUE is a user equilibrium if for any OD pair and all
9Remark that in Section 4.4 we have shown that the results obtained when both road pricing and traﬃc
lights are available are the lowest attainable in the network. We will thus use the terms lowest cost and
TCint interchangeably.
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routes connecting this OD pair
ACr(f
UE) ≤ lim
→0
inf{ACs(fUE + α1r − α1s) : 0 < α < min(, fs)} (4.18)
with s any route connecting the same OD pair as route r. In this deﬁnition 1i denotes the
vector with a '1' in position i and a '0' elsewhere.
The traﬃc authority wants the social equilibrium to coincide with the user equilibrium.
And to obtain the lowest cost, the traﬃc authority will implement the socially optimal signal
setting (r∗2) when the ﬂow pattern is socially optimal. Taking all this into account, a valid
function has to satisfy the following constraints.
AC1(X
∗
1 , r
∗
2) ≤ lim
→0
inf{AC2(X∗2 + α1, r2) : 0 < α < min(,X∗1 )} (4.19)
AC2(X
∗
2 , r
∗
2) ≤ lim
→0
inf{AC1(X∗1 + α1, r2) : 0 < α < min(,X∗2 )} (4.20)
Here, (X∗1 , X∗2 ) is the socially optimal ﬂow, (r∗2) is the socially optimal signal setting
and r2 is the function we are looking for. When the signal setting is such that equations
(4.19) and (4.20) are satisﬁed, the socially optimal ﬂow is a user equilibrium.
Figure 4.12: The average cost in the optimum is diﬀerent on both routes
Remark that AC1(X∗1 , r∗2) and AC2(X∗2 , r∗2) are generally not equal. Equations (4.19)
and (4.20) thus indicate that the function that maps the ﬂow distribution in a signal setting
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has to be discontinuous.
When the ﬂow is not in equilibrium, e.g. due to a shock, the drivers will change routes
to minimize their private cost. This process has to converge to the equilibrium ﬂow. As a
consequence, a valid function also has to satisfy the following constraints:
AC1(X1) < AC2 ∀X1 < X∗1 (4.21)
AC1(X1) > AC2 ∀X1 > X∗1 (4.22)
There exist many functions that can satisfy these constraints. However, given that
the objective of this paper is only to show that there exists a function that satisﬁes the
constraints, we limit ourselves to the elaboration of the simplest case with a ﬁxed signal
setting rh2 for all X1 > X
∗
1 and a ﬁxed signal setting r
l
2 for all X1 < X
∗
1 .
4.4.3 Characterization of the ﬁxed signal settings and numerical example
As mentioned before, r2 has to equal r∗2, when the ﬂow pattern is socially optimal. This
thus determines the signal setting when X1 = X∗1 . Using the constraints in Section 4.4.2,
we will also characterize the ﬁxed signal setting for X1 < X∗1 and for X1 > X∗1 .
f(X1) =

rl2 if X1 < X
∗
1
r∗2 if X1 = X∗1
rh2 if X1 > X
∗
1
We ﬁrst focus on the area right of the social optimum. With ﬁxed signal settings,
undersaturated traﬃc conditions and linear congestion AC1 is linearly increasing in X1. So
any rh2 satisfying AC2(X
∗
2 , r
∗
2) ≤ AC1(X∗1 , rh2 ) will also satisfy equation (4.20). With AC1
linearly increasing inX1 and AC2 linearly decreasing inX2, any rh2 satisfyingAC1(X
∗
1 , r
h
2 ) >
AC2(X
∗
2 , r
h
2 ) will also satisfy equation (4.24) (see Figure 4.13). The constraints that thus
determine a feasible rh2 can be written as follows:
f1 + a1X
∗
1 +
(
c− rh2
)2
2c
≥ a2X∗2 + f2 +
(r∗2)
2
2c
(4.23)
f1 + a1X
∗
1 +
(
c− rh2
)2
2c
> a2X
∗
2 + f2 +
(
rh2
)2
2c
(4.24)
Equation (4.23) reduces further to:
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Figure 4.13: Average cost functions associated with rh2 that satisfy the constraints
rh2 ≤ c−
√√√√(f2 − f1 + (a2 − a1)X∗1 + a2N + (r∗2)22c
)
2c (4.25)
and equation (4.24) reduces to:
rh2 < f1 − f2 − (a2 − a1)X∗1 − a2N +
c
2
(4.26)
In Appendix L we show that if AC2(X∗2 , r∗2) > AC1(X∗1 , r∗2), then equation (4.25) im-
plies equation (4.26) and if AC2(X∗2 , r∗2) < AC1(X∗1 , r∗2), equation (4.26) implies equation
(4.25) for all X1 > X∗1 .
Next, we analyse the area left of the social optimum. Also here, there are two con-
straints that have to be satisﬁed.
With ﬁxed signal settings AC2 is linearly decreasing in X1 and equation (4.19) will
always be satisﬁed when AC1(X∗1 , r∗2) ≤ AC2(X∗2 , rl2) is satisﬁed. Equation (4.21) always
holds for any rl2 that satisﬁes AC1(X
∗
1 , r
l
2) < AC2(X
∗
2 , r
l
2) (see Figure 4.14). A feasible r
l
2
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Figure 4.14: Average cost functions associated with rl2 that satisfy the constraints
will thus satisfy the following constraints:
a2X
∗
2 + f2 +
(
rl2
)2
2c
≥ f1 + a1X∗1 +
(c− r∗2)2
2c
(4.27)
a2X
∗
2 + f2 +
(
rl2
)2
2c
> f1 + a1X
∗
1 +
(
c− rl2
)2
2c
(4.28)
Equation (4.27) reduces to
rl2 ≥
√√√√(f1 − f2 + (a1 + a2)X∗1 − a2N + (c− r∗2)22c
)
2c (4.29)
and equation (4.28) reduces to
rl2 > f1 − f2 +
(r∗)2
2c
+ (a1 + a2)X
∗
1 − a2N +
c
2
(4.30)
If AC1(X∗1 , r∗2) > AC2(X∗2 , r∗2), then equation (4.29) implies equation (4.30) and if
AC2(X
∗
2 , r
∗
2) > AC1(X
∗
1 , r
∗
2), equation (4.30) implies equation (4.29).
Suppose there are 30,000 drivers per time unit (N) that want to go from A to B. The
minimal time and resource cost equals 22 euro for Route 1 (f1), and 3 euro for Route 2 (f2).
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The parameters a1 and a2 are 0.003 and 0.0005 euro time units per driver respectively. The
total duration of red and green time (c) equals 50 time units.
Table 4.2: When road pricing is applied, the optimal result is obtained when both routes are used
in the equilibrium.
(r2 = 0; τ = 0) (r2 = 50; τ = 0) (rint2 = 7.5; τ
int = 0.75)
Total cost 1, 110, 000 2, 790, 000 1, 056, 000
For these parameter values, the total cost when the traﬃc authority implements the
in Section 4.4.1 calculated optimal alternating signal setting and toll is lower than the total
cost when the traﬃc authority implements either r2 = 0 or r2 = c (see Table 4.2). The
traﬃc authority will thus implement a signal setting that varies with the ﬂow distribution
to obtain this cost without having to implement road pricing. We will use the framework
developed in Section 4.4.2 to deduce the ﬂow-dependent signal setting f(X1) for this spe-
ciﬁc example.
The optimal red time for Route 2 equals 7.5 time units. The optimal ﬂow on Route
1 is 4,500 vehicles per time unit, and thus 25,500 vehicles per time unit on Route 2. For
this optimal combination of red time and ﬂow distribution, AC2(25, 500; 7.5) is larger than
AC1(4, 500; 7.5). Consequently, the constraint that determines rh2 for all X1 > X
∗
1 is given
by equation (4.25). For the given parameter values, this equation reduces to:
0 < rh2 ≤ 1.72 (4.31)
The constraint that determines rl2 for all X1 < X
∗
1 is given by equation (4.30). Here,
this equation reduces to:
c > rl2 > 6.75 (4.32)
The signal setting f(X1) can then be determined as follows:
f(X1) =

10 if X1 < 4, 500
7.5 if X1 = 4, 500
1 if X1 > 4, 500
Remark that even though for all the ﬂow patterns left of the equilibrium (X1 < X∗1 )
there are not enough Route 1 drivers compared to the amount of Route 1 drivers in the
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equilibrium, equation (4.32) does not specify that the red time for Route 1 has to decrease
for all X1 < X∗1 (compared to the red time for Route 1 in the equilibrium). A deviation
to Route 2 from the equilibrium is thus not necessarily punished by an increase in the
red time for Route 2. This is because the other cost components are such that even for
7.5 ≥ rl2 > 6.75 equation (4.19) and equation (4.21) are still satisﬁed.
Table 4.3: Contrary to the optimal ﬁxed signal setting, the ﬂow dependent signal setting allows
to obtain the same result as road pricing.
r2 =
a2c
a1+a2
f(X1) (rint2 = 7.5; τ
int = 0.75)
Total cost 1, 056, 120 1, 056, 000 1, 056, 000
The total costs in Table 4.3 show that f(X1) indeed allows to obtain the same result
as road pricing. The optimal ﬂow-independent alternating signal setting, by contrast, has
a higher total cost.
Figure 4.15: Shape of the average cost functions for a feasible ﬂow-dependent signal setting
With f(X1) the ﬂow dependent signal setting, the average cost curve of Route 2 is
given by:
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AC2(X2) =

23 + 0.0005X2 if X1 < 4, 500
35.31 if X1 = 4, 500
22.01 + 0.0005X2 if X1 > 4, 500
The average cost curve of Route 1 equals:
AC1(X1) =

19 + 0.003X1 if X1 < 4, 500
34.56 if X1 = 4, 500
27.01 + 0.003X1 if X1 > 4, 500
Remark that for all X1 > 4, 500 AC1 is always greater than 35.31 and AC1 is always
greater than AC2. Similarly, for all X1 < 4, 500, AC2 is always greater than 34.56 and AC2
is always greater than AC1.
4.5 Practical considerations
In the previous section, we have shown that a signal setting determined by the inverse
Stackelberg approach allows to obtain the same results as when the traﬃc authority has
both traﬃc lights and a toll to work with. In the user equilibrium that is brought about
when the inverse Stackelberg approach is used, the average cost on Route 1 and Route 2 is
generally not equal. This might raise concerns regarding the stability of this user equilib-
rium. To determine the eﬀect on the stability of the equilibrium, we distinguish between
the situation in which drivers learn the average cost by experience and the situation in
which the average cost is common knowledge.
If the average cost is known only be experience, then a driver who uses the highest
cost route in equilibrium, might experience a lower cost if he deviates from the equilibrium
distribution at the same moment as another driver who takes the other route in the equi-
librium. This could then result in swapping behaviour. At a certain point, however, the
drivers who take the route with the lowest cost in equilibrium will not deviate anymore.
Consequently, the drivers on the route which has the highest cost in equilibrium will always
experience a higher cost when deviating and will also stop deviating.
Currently many cars are equipped with route guidance and information systems. These
devices can provide information or guide drivers to certain routes. If the average cost
functions are known to all drivers, the traﬃc authority could obtain the socially optimal
distribution of vehicles over the two routes by each day randomly assigning X∗1 drivers
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to Route 1 and X∗2 drivers to Route 2. As for every individual driver, the resulting time
averaged cost is lower than the time averaged cost when the signal setting is determined by
a Stackelberg approach (which is the second best alternative in this case), a rational driver
has no incentive to deviate from the assigned route. The assumption of rationality could,
however, be very strong in this case. When this assumption is relaxed, the optimal policy
for the authority would be to randomly assign X∗1 drivers to Route 1 and X∗2 drivers to
Route 2 and ﬁne each driver who deviates from his assigned route. The optimal ﬁne would
then equal the incurred cost of all the other drivers due to the deviation of this driver,
which would then be redistributed among the other drivers.
Another line of approach can be found in Jahn et al. (2005). This paper adopts a
system optimum approach but honors the individual needs by imposing additional con-
traints to ensure the drivers are assigned to acceptable paths only. Acceptable paths are
determined by their level of fairness with respect to the user cost in the user equilibrium
and several notions of unfairness are introduced. Jahn et al. (2005) show that their model
leads to a signiﬁcantly better utilization of a traﬃc network.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have compared the performance of traﬃc lights and tolls for two diﬀer-
ent networks. For the network with two parallel routes, we have modeled both the signal
setting procedure and the toll setting procedure as a Stackelberg game. We ﬁnd that tolls
generally perform better than traﬃc lights.
For the network in which traﬃc lights regulate the intersection of two routes connect-
ing one OD pair, we have used a Stackelberg approach as well as an inverse Stackelberg
approach. We have derived the conditions a signal setting has to satisfy to be able to obtain
the same results as when both traﬃc lights and a toll can be used to optimize the network.
With a numerical example, this paper showed that it is possible to ﬁnd a ﬂow-dependent
signal setting that can render road pricing redundant.
This study is designated as an initial step towards ﬁnding ﬂow-dependent signal set-
tings that can render road pricing redundant. A possible extension to this paper would
then study diﬀerent functional forms that allow ﬂow-dependent signal setting to reach the
same result as road pricing.
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Chapter 5
Eﬃcient transportation policies for
sustainable cities
5.1 Introduction
In the context of sustainability, many European cities want to increase the liveability of
their city center. Diﬀerent cities have explored alternative ways to curb traﬃc. London
charges a congestion fee for commuters who drive into the city center, Copenhagen is cre-
ating bicycle superhighways to connect the suburbs to the city, Hamburg is working on a
Green network that would eliminate the need for cars within the city, . . .What is now the
most eﬃcient transport policy to reduce congestion externalities, accident risk and noise
and air pollution? It is to this question that this paper formulates an answer.
To analyze the eﬀects of alternative transport policies, this paper develops a model in
a multi-user multi-period multimodal context, keeping locations ﬁxed. This model ﬁts in
the tradition of MOLINO-models (De Palma et al. (2010), Kilani et al. (2014)).
The supply part of the model is deﬁned by several ﬁxed origin destination pairs that
are connected by combinations of links. The generalized cost of a link contains several com-
ponents: a monetary cost, taxes levied by the government, and a time cost which can be
a function of the number of users. In urban transportation, many trips use more than one
mode of transport. The model therefore allows for combined trips as well as unimodal trips.
81
5.2. Literature
Consumers choose between alternative ways of transportation on the basis of their
subjective preferences and the perceived generalized cost of the diﬀerent transport alter-
natives. For each user category and each OD pair we compose an aggregate nested CES
utility function with three levels: choice between transport and consumption of a com-
posite commodity (ﬁrst nest), choice between peak and oﬀ-peak period (second nest), and
choice between the transport alternatives (third nest). As in many cities a large share of all
transport externalities comes from incoming traﬃc (such as commuting traﬃc) and from
pure through traﬃc (i.e., traﬃc that has neither origin nor destination within the city), the
model distinguishes between diﬀerent types of transport users. Furthermore, multiple user
classes are considered, as fares can diﬀer according to the purpose of the trip.
The model can be used in two ways. First, it can be used to measure the eﬀects of
diﬀerent types of transport policies and trade oﬀ their total welfare eﬀects. Second, the
model can be used to maximize social welfare by adjusting transit design variables, network
pricing and changing network design.
The model is illustrated to the city of Leuven, Belgium. Three transport policies to
reduce the traﬃc externalities in the city center are considered: introducing road pricing in
the city center, raising parking fees in the center of Leuven and expanding public transport.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of
the relevant literature. Section 3 develops the theoretical model. Section 4 discusses the
properties of the numerical model and the characteristics of the reference equilibrium in
Leuven. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 oﬀers a conclusion.
5.2 Literature
The available urban transport studies diﬀer in terms of the amount of spatial, temporal
and modal detail in the representation of urban transport, as well as in the transport cost
components that are taken into account.
The most common approach in the urban transportation literature is to deal with each
mode of transport separately. Mohring (1972) developed a model that considers optimal
frequency and spacing of stops. He found the optimal frequency to be proportional to the
square root of demand. Jansson (1980) extended the square root principle to a model in
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which service frequency is optimized simultaneously with bus size. Ahn (2009) extended
Mohring's work to the case where buses share the congestion interaction road with other
automobiles. Tirachini (2014) reconsidered the problem of choosing the number of bus
stops along urban routes.
Going beyond systems with a single mode of transportation, some papers concentrate on
the bimodal problem. Basso and Jara-Díaz (2012) focus on the analytical properties of op-
timal prices and design of transport services in a bimodal context. In a two-mode system,
De Borger and Wouters (1998) study the joint optimisation of transport prices and supply
decisions of urban transport services. This paper extends this literature by focusing on a
multimodal setting.
From spatial point of view, many papers focus on a single corridor setting. Tirachini
and Hensher (2011), for instance, study the impact of fare payment technology on a bus
corridor. Tirachini et al. (2014) develops a model that allows to analyse the interplay be-
tween congestion and externalities in the design of public transport services. The model is
applied to a single transport corridor in Sydney, Australia. Unlike previous literature, this
paper takes a network approach.
Another paper that takes a network approach is Tirachini et al. (2010). Using data
from Australian cities, this paper compares light rail, heavy rail, and BRT on a radial tran-
sit network. The analysis, however, only focuses on costs, which does not allow to make
welfare comparisons between diﬀerent scenarios, as the consumer utility is not taken into
account. Unlike this paper, we also account for changes in consumer surplus.
Among the models that include environmental, accident or noise externalities in their
analysis we can cite De Borger et al. (1996), Proost and Van Dender (2008) and Parry and
Small (2009).
5.3 The model
The case study results presented in Section 5 are based on a multimodal model of the
transport system. This section develops this model theoretically by ﬁrst focusing on the
demand side, subsequently unfolding the supply side, and ﬁnally constructing the diﬀerent
components of the welfare function.
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5.3.1 Demand
The demand for travel is subdivided into M classes of representative users with diﬀerent
socio-economic characteristics. These classes diﬀer with respect to their travel preferences,
incomes, and costs of travel. For every user class and every OD pair, we calibrate a nested
CES utility function with four levels as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Utility
Transport
Peak
r1 r10 rRw
Oﬀ-Peak
r1 r10 rRw
Other consumption
· · ·· · · · · ·· · ·
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Level 0
Figure 5.1: CES implementation of the utility function
The travelers can decide on the number of trips (ﬁrst nest), whether to travel in the
peak or oﬀ-peak period (second nest) and which combination of links to use to go from their
origin to their destination (third nest). The elasticity of substitution for every branching
of the choice tree will determine the ease of substitution between diﬀerent transport alter-
natives. When travelers consider diﬀerent routes to be perfect substitutes, the Wardrop
equilibrium (Wardrop (1952)) prevails. In this paper we focus on the more realistic stochas-
tic user equilibrium (Daganzo and Sheﬃ (1977)), which departs from the assumption that
travelers try to minimize their perceived travel cost.
The main advantage of the nested CES formulation is its ease of calibration. If the
elasticities of substitution at each branch plus the total quantities and prices at the lowest
level of the utility tree are available, the shareparameters ψi,e can be calculated to exactly
reproduce this exogenous baseline. In this way, the CES functions are calibrated.
When the preferences and behaviour of the travelers are described by a nested CES
utility function, it can be shown that the demand functions take the following form (Keller
(1976)):
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q0,i =
I
P3
3∏
e=1
ψe−1,i(
Pe,i
Pe−1,i
)σe,i ∀i (5.1)
where ψ is a share parameter, σ is the elasticity of substitution, P is the general-
ized price, I equals total income, index i stands for the diﬀerent commodities that aﬀect
consumer utility and e denotes the level. These demand functions are the solution of a
constrained utility maximization problem in which all the utility components are linear
homogeneous functions of the associated components at the next lower level.
The demand for transport services q0,i corresponds to the number of trips on route
r from OD pair w from user class m in period p. We will further denote this demand by
Y m,pr,w . From equation (5.1) it is clear that demand is a function of the generalized price. In
the next section, we will discuss the generalized price in detail.
5.3.2 Supply
A directed transportation network G(N;L) is deﬁned by a set N of nodes and a set L of
directed links (denoted l=1,. . . ,L). Let W be the set of all OD pairs in the network (denoted
w=1, . . . , W), and Rw be the set of routes between OD pair w ∈W. We furthermore deﬁne
a set of dummy indicators δlr to denote whether link l is part of route r.
This paper deﬁnes a link by the two nodes it connects and by the mode that is used. The
set L thus includes the set of automobile links LU , the set of transit links LZ , the set of
bike links LB and the set of pedestrian links LV . Each link in the multimodal network has
an associated travel cost which consists of a monetary cost and a time cost. These two cost
components are discussed in detail in the next subsections.
5.3.2.1 Monetary cost
For travelers on a public transport link, the monetary cost equals the fare the user pays. We
assume this fare to vary between the peak and the oﬀ-peak period, and between diﬀerent
public transport modes. Furthermore, we assume the fare to be charged proportionally to
the travel distance.
The monetary cost for a car link is the sum of the resource cost and, if applicable, the
congestion toll and the parking cost. The resource cost includes fuel costs, maintenance
and operational costs, and investment costs. We assume that these costs are shared by the
occupants of the car.
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For a bicycle link the monetary cost equals the resource cost, which includes the pur-
chasing price of the bicycle and the maintenance cost. For a trip on foot, there is no
monetary cost.
Deﬁning a dummy indicator λli that equals 1 if link l is associated with mode i, the
monetary cost for link l in period p is given by
mcpl =
(
Z∑
z
hpz λlz +
τpl + rcu
n
λlu + rcb λlb
)
al, (5.2)
where hpz is the fare in period p for public transport mode z [AC/km], rcu is the resource
cost for a car [AC/km], τpl is the congestion toll in period p for a car on link l [AC/km], n is
the car occupancy, rcb is the resource cost for a bicycle [AC/km] and al is the length of link
l [km].
5.3.2.2 Time cost
The generalized travel time cost is a weighted sum of in-vehicle time, waiting time and
walking time. First, consider in-vehicle time. When formulating the in-vehicle time, we
follow Basso and Silva (2014) and distinguish between the case in which infrastructure is
shared between diﬀerent modes and the case in which infrastructure is separate. The time
it takes to travel one km on link l in period p when infrastructure is separated is given by:
ivtpl = freel
(
1 + α
(
cepl
Cl
)β)
(5.3)
With parameter values α = 0.15 and β = 4, this function is known as the BPR
(Bureau of Public Roads) function. In the above equation freel is the free-ﬂow travel
time on link l [h/km], Cl is the capacity of the infrastructure measured in equivalent car
trips per hour, and cepl represents the ﬂow on link l (in car equivalents per hour) in period p.
Depending on the mode that operates on a link, the formulation of the ﬂow diﬀers.
The car ﬂow is given by:
cepl =
∑
w∈W
∑
r∈Rw
∑
m∈M δlr Y
m,p
r,w
n Hp
∀l ∈ LU (5.4)
where Y m,pr,w is the demand on route r from OD pair w and user class m in period p,
Hp is the period duration [h], n is the car occupancy and δlr is a dummy indicator that
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equals 1 if route r uses link l and 0 otherwise.
For public transit links the ﬂow is given by:
cepl = f
p
l µ ∀l ∈ LZ (5.5)
where fpl [veh/h] is the frequency on link l in period p, and µ is an equivalence factor.
For bike and pedestrian links, we assume the car equivalents to be zero. The ﬂow on
link l in period p can thus be modelled as follows:
cepl =
∑
w∈W
∑
r∈Rw
∑
m∈M δlr Y
m,p
r,w
n Hp
λlu + f
p
l µ λlz (5.6)
When traﬃc conditions are mixed, we have to consider congestion across modes. The
in-vehicle time for link l in period p is then represented as follows:
ivtpl = freel
1 + α(cepl +∑Lρ6=l cepρ γlρ
Cl
)β (5.7)
In this equation γlρ is a dummy indicator that equals one if link l shares its infras-
tructure with link ρ.
Next, consider waiting time. For travel by car, foot or bicycle there is no need to wait,
so only trips by public transit have a waiting cost component. When modeling the waiting
time for public transit links, we follow Tirachini et al. (2010) in distinguishing between
services with a low frequency and services with a high frequency.
For high frequency services1 we can assume a uniform arrival distribution of passengers
at the station. Consequently, the waiting time can be modeled as a fraction (θi) of the
headway. For low frequency services, the waiting time consists of two components. First,
passengers incur schedule delay, as they have to travel either earlier or later than they
would like to. The schedule delay cost increases proportionally with the headway, so it can
be modeled as a fraction of the headway. Besides schedule delay cost, travelers also incur a
safety waiting cost. Indeed, travelers generally calculate in some additional safety time at
the station. The average waiting time can then be modeled as follows:
waitpl =
(
l
(
θ1
fpl
)
+ (1− l)
(
s+ κ
θ2
fpl
))
lz
(5.8)
1For the applications we will follow Tirachini et al. (2010) and use 12 minutes as threshold headway.
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where fpl is the frequency of the transit mode on link l in period p, κ is a factor in-
dicating that waiting time at the station outweighs waiting time at home, l is a dummy
indicator that equals 1 if the frequency is high and 0 otherwise and s is the safety time.
Finally, consider access time. It is clear that only public transit link costs have an
access time component. We assume this to be a ﬁxed component dependent on the link,
accessl.
When we multiply the diﬀerent time components with their respective value of time,
we get a monetary cost. The generalized cost for link l in period p is thus given by:
gtcpl = V OTivt ivt
p
l al + V OTwait wait
p
l + V OTaccess accessl (5.9)
where V OTivt is the value of in-vehicle time [AC/h], ivt
p
i is the in-vehicle time in period
p for link l [h], V OTwait is the value of waiting time [AC/h], wait
p
l stands for the waiting time
on link l in period p [h], V OTaccess is the value of access time [AC/h] and accessl represents
the time needed to access the transport mode [h].
The travel time on route r ∈ Rw in period p between OD pair w ∈ W is given by the
sum of the generalized costs gc of the links that are used:
cw,pr =
∑
l∈Ltl
δwlr gc
p
l ∀r ∈ Rw, ∀w ∈W (5.10)
where δwlr = 1 if route r between OD pair w uses link l, and 0 otherwise.
5.3.3 Welfare function
The objective function includes consumer surplus, external costs, government revenue, tran-
sit agency net revenues, operational transit costs, and implementation costs of policies.
Total consumer surplus is given by the sum of the consumer surplus of all types of
users and all OD pairs: ∑
w∈W
∑
m∈M
Um,w (5.11)
We consider the external costs of congestion, accidents, air pollution and noise. The
external congestion costs enter the utility function via the generalized consumer prices. The
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external costs of accidents, air pollution and noise are considered separately. We assume
these costs to be constant per vehicle kilometer. As a result the total external cost per day
is given by:
L∑
l
P∑
p
(ecl ce
p
l )al (5.12)
In the above equation, ecl represents the external cost [AC/km], ce
p
l is the ﬂow, in car
equivalents per hour, on link l in period p and al is the length of link l.
The government revenues per day consist of the sum of the daily parking and toll
revenues.
∑
l∈LUtoll
P∑
p
τpl ce
p
l +
∑
l∈LUpark
P∑
p
parl ce
p
l (5.13)
where U toll contains the car links that are part of a tolling zone, Upark is the set
of car links that have a parking component and parl stands for the parking fee on link
l [AC/vehicle]. The changes in toll revenue receive a diﬀerent weight than the changes in
consumer and producer surplus to account for the marginal cost of public funds.
The transit agency collects the daily fare revenues:
Z∑
z
P∑
p
W∑
w
M∑
m
∑
r∈Rw
(hpz λlz) al δ
w
lr Y
n,p
r,w ∀l ∈ LZ (5.14)
In equation (5.14) hpz is the fare of public transit mode z in period p, λlz is a dummy
indicator that equals 1 if link l is associated with mode z, Y m,pr,w is the demand on route r
from OD pair w and user class m in period p, δwlr = 1 if route r between OD pair w uses
link l and al is the length of link l.
The operating costs of the transportation system encompass vehicle maintenance costs
(fuel, tires, vehicle servicing), vehicle operation costs (operating staﬀ wages, administration,
ticketing and fare collection, system security) and non-vehicle maintenance costs (roadway,
track, signals, and stations). In equation (5.15) below, the ﬁrst term captures the daily
distance-related costs, the second term represents the daily time-related costs and the third
term route-related costs.
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∑
z
∑
p
∑
l
lenghtlH
p fpl vmcz λlz+
∑
l
∑
p
lenghtl
Hp fpl
speedpl
vocl+
∑
l
lenghtl nvmcl (5.15)
The daily vehicle-kilometers are the sum of the vehicles-kilometers in both periods:∑
l
∑
pH
p fpl lengthl, where length is the length of the route on link l. vmcz is the vehicle
maintenance cost [AC/vehkm] for public transit mode z. vocl is the vehicle operation cost
[AC/vehh] which is multiplied by the total daily vehicle hours:
∑
l
∑
p lengthl
Hp fp
speedpl
. Finally,
nvmcl is the non-vehicle maintenance cost per route kilometer.
We model the net investment cost of public transit vehicle capacity as a function of
the ﬂeet (FL) in the following way:
(1 + soft) (implz lengthl λlz + FL price)−RV (5.16)
In this equation, soft stands for the fraction of soft costs, implz is the implementation
cost for public transit mode z [AC/km], lengthl is the length of the track [km], price represents
the purchasing price per vehicle and RV is the residual value of the investment at time T,
where T is determined by the technical life of the vehicle. The required ﬂeet is determined
by the following equation:
FL =
L∑
l
disl
0, 85
max
p
fpl
speedpl
(5.17)
where disl is the total distance that a vehicle covers before starting a new cycle and
speedpl is the speed on link l in period p. To account for a ﬂeet reserve capacity of 15%,
this term is divided by 0.85.
To allow for comparison between diﬀerent scenario's, the net present value is calcu-
lated.
5.4 Case study
The geographical area covered by the case study is the zone encompassing the conurbation
of Leuven. Figure 5.2 represents this area schematically by distinguishing four regions: the
center of Leuven (C), the periphery (PER), the suburban employment center (SEC), and
the surrouding region (O). Like many European cities, Leuven has a radial structure. The
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model assumes the parts in between the radials in the surrounding region to be symmetrical
in terms of demand, capacity, costs, etc.
Figure 5.2: Schematical representation of the conurbation of Leuven
In the morning, travelers from the outside region travel to the center or the suburban
employment center. Travelers living in the center either go to a destination in the center or
travel to the suburban employment center. And travelers residing in the periphery either
go to the center or the suburban employment center. In Table 5.1 the ﬂow between the
diﬀerent OD pairs in the reference year 2009 is presented.
Table 5.1: Number of passengers per hour in the reference year 2009
O→ C C→ C PER→ C C→ SEC O→ SEC
Peak 11,002 32,660 14,515 9,081 4,421
Oﬀ-peak 6,348 21,154 8,707 5,400 2,288
Users can choose to travel by car, train, bus, bike or they can walk to their destination.
In Table 5.2 the diﬀerent modes that can be used to go from an origin to a destination are
listed. Both unimodal and multi-modal trips are considered. Car and bus can be used for
all trips. Only trips in the city center can be done on foot. The train is only used for
91
5.4. Case study
trips between the city and the outside region. The bike can be used for all trips except for
the trips between the city and the outside region. In Table 5.3 the trip purpose shares per
mode in the city center are given for the reference year 2009.
Table 5.2: Model combinations considered
O→ C C→ C PER→ C C→ SEC O→ SEC
car x x x x x
walk x
bike x x x
bus x x x x x
train+walk x
train+bus x x
train+bike x x
bus+bike x x
bus+walk x
Table 5.3: Mode choice shares and trip purpose shares in the city center for the reference year
2009
Car Bus Bike Pedestrian Total
School 54% 85% 60% 66% 61%
Work 40% 14% 39% 20% 32%
Other 6% 1% 1% 14% 7%
Figure 5.3 shows the multimodal network. This hypernetwork consists of ﬁve sub-
networks: the auto network, the train network, the bike network, the bus network and
the pedestrian network. The hypernetworks or supernetworks combine networks of various
modes (car, bike, train, etc) and include special links to interconnect them (represented by
the dashed lines in Figure 5.3). To these links transfer costs are attributed. A path trough
the network including such a transfer link then represents a multimodal trip. Apart from
transfer links, transit links and private transport links, we also include embarking links and
alighting links. These links capture the relevant waiting and access time.
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Figure 5.3: Network representation of the conurbation of Leuven
The model is implemented by adapting the MOLINO-model and calibrated for the
reference year 2009 using observed prices and quantities for all transport modes together
with information on the ease of substitution between transport and other goods as well as
between the diﬀerent means of transport.
Observed quantities per OD pair and per trip purpose are obtained from Vlaams
Verkeerscentrum (See Appendix M). Data per mode share is calculated using mode share
data in Janssens et al. (2012). Observed prices consist of a monetary and a time cost. Table
5.4 lists the resource cost for the diﬀerent modes.
Table 5.4: Resource costs
resource cost
car 0.32 euro/vehiclekm
bike 0.23 euro/km
train 0.06 euro/personkm
bus 26.51 euro/vehiclekm
Source: Delhaye et al. (2010)
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To calculate the time costs in the reference case we have used observed speed data.
Table 5.5 shows the travel time per mode in the city center for commuters in the reference
case.
Table 5.5: Travel time in the center (min)
car pedestrian bus bike
work peak 3.00 16.67 4.20 3.33
work oﬀ-peak 2.10 16.67 3.30 3.33
Remark that, although cars and buses are assumed to use the same infrastructure, the
travel time when driving is lower than when taking the bus. This is because we have taken
into account the delay at bus stops.
The calibrate the nested CES functions we need two more inputs; for each level we
need to specify the elasticity of substitution (Table 5.6) and we need to determine the share
of income per user class (Table 5.7).
Table 5.6: The elasticities of substitution
work other school
transport/other 1.4 1.4 1.4
peak/oﬀ-peak 1.2 2 1.5
paths 2 2 2
Source: Kilani et al. (2014)
Table 5.7: Percentage of income spent on transportation
work school other
5% 10% 7%
The capacity of each link is chosen to ﬁt the observed speeed-ﬂow data. As such, truck
traﬃc is also incorporated, though as a constant.
For the city of Leuven, 3 scenarios to reduce externalities in the city center are con-
sidered: introducing road pricing, expanding public transport and raising parking fees. In
the next section, the eﬀects of these three scenarios is assessed.
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5.5 The eﬀects of alternative policies
This section presents the impact of three transport policies on traﬃc volumes, external
costs, welfare, etc. We ﬁrst assess the eﬀects of the introduction of road pricing. Second,
we describe the consequences of an increase in parking fees in the city center. Third, we
examine the impact of the construction of a tram lane. And ﬁnally, we compare the welfare
eﬀects of the diﬀerent policies from the viewpoint of the city authority on the one hand,
and from societal perspective, on the other hand.
5.5.1 Introducing zonal pricing
In the ﬁrst scenario, we analyze the eﬀect of introducing a zonal congestion charge in the
city center for car traﬃc. The toll comprises the full external cost and amounts to 0.28 euro
in the peak period and 0.06 euro in the oﬀ peak period. The toll revenues are collected by
the city authority.
Introducing road pricing reduces ﬂows by approximately 10% in the city center, which
leads to travel speed increases of more than 20% (see Table 5.8). The resulting decrease
in time cost, can however, not compensate for the price increase due to the toll levy. The
increase in generalized price will thus lower consumer surplus which induces travelers to
divert from the city center roads to the ringroad, or to divert from car use to public transit
or soft means of transportation (biking, walking). The increase in patronage for public
transit increases the frequency and reduces the waiting time, which, on its turn, attracts
new users.2 The introduction of a road toll on cars also reduces the total amount of travelers
by 3%. As drivers either refrain from travelling, or switch to lower externality modes, the
total noise, accidents and pollution cost decreases by approximately 10%.
5.5.2 Increasing the cost of parking
In the second scenario, the parking fee is increased by the weighted average of the exter-
nality in peak and oﬀ-peak, where the diﬀerent weights are given by the relative elasticity.
In the reference scenario the parking cost was 2.1 euro per hour.3 After the increase the
parking fee amounts to 2.24 euro per hour. We assume commuters to have parking provided
by their employer. As such they are not aﬀected by the increase in parking fees.
2We do not take into account congestion discomfort costs.
3We will assume that drivers park on average for three hours.
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Due to the increase in parking fees, the number of cars in the city center decreases with
approximately 3%. This results in a decrease of accident, pollution and noise externalities
by more than 3% as drivers change from a mode with a large externality to a mode with a
small (or positive) externality (public transit, soft modes).
The eﬀects are similar to the road pricing case, though smaller in magnitude. This
can be attributed to the fact that a large group of travelers, i.e. commuters, is not aﬀected
by the increase in parking fees.
5.5.3 Expanding public transit
As there was mention of a tram in Leuven (Rijnders (2014)), we assess the impact of the
construction of a separated tram lane in the city center and between the city center and the
suburban employment center. The total investment cost amounts to 154.625.250 euro and
is based on data from Van Oppens (2013) and RebelGroup Advisory Belgium NV (2013).
When a tram line runs between the city center and the SEC, buses are banned out of the
city center and also the buses between the city center and the SEC are dispensed with. The
capacity that has become available on the car links, as a result of the absence of buses on
the road and the construction of a separated tram lane, is ocupied by additional cars. As
a result, the speed in the city remains approximately at the same level as does the travel
cost for car travelers.
Table 5.8: Eﬀects of the diﬀerent scenarios in the city center
Reference Full external Parking Tram
equilibrium cost pricing charges
Change w.r.t. the reference (%)
NPV (mio euro)
Total delay cost 0.577 -44 -11 -33
Total noise, accidents
and pollution cost 23.06 -10.34 -3.11 -2.35
Traﬃc ﬂow (CE/day) 221,266 -10.66 -3.21 -0.008
Speed (km/h)
Peak 19.99 +20.06 +3.05 +0.15
Oﬀ-peak 28.5 +0.7 +0.7 +0.14
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5.5.4 Welfare eﬀects
The welfare functions of the city authority divert from the welfare function of society. The
city authority takes into account the consumer surplus of the local citizens, the accidents,
pollution and noise in the city and the revenues for the city. The welfare function for soci-
ety, on the other hand, includes consumer surplus and accidents, pollution and noise costs
for all those involved, also in the outside region. It furthermore includes revenues for all
authorities, local and central, and the ﬁnancial result of the transit agency.
Table 5.9: Welfare eﬀects of the diﬀerent scenarios
Reference Full external Parking Tram
equilibrium cost pricing charges
NPV (mio euro) Change w.r.t. the reference (%)
Welfare city 42,425.97 +0.49 -0.06 +0.001
CS city 40,379.98 -0.16 -0.04 +0.002
Parking city 2,082.12 +0.58 -0.45 -0.03
Externalities city 44.13 -9.83 -2.68 1.37
Welfare society 166,777.36 +0.04 -0.08 -0.03
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Table 5.9 summarizes the welfare eﬀects of the diﬀerent scenarios and compares them
with the reference situation. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst choice for the city authority would be
to implement road pricing in the city center as this increases local welfare by 0.49%. The
result for society is also positive (+0.04%), though smaller. This can be explained by the
fact that the beneﬁts of tolling are now balanced by a larger amount of people who see their
consumer surplus decrease.
Suppose that the city authority is impeded from introducing road pricing by political
reasons. In this case the city authority will opt for the construction of a tram lane, as
this will increase city welfare by 0.001%. The construction of a tram line is, however,
welfare decreasing from societal point of view. This bifurcation does not surprise as the
city authority does not take into account the investment cost of the project.
Even though the price of driving through the city increases on average by the same
amount when parking charges are increased as when a toll is levied, total welfare decreases
in this case (as opposed to the total welfare increase in the toll case). This loss in welfare
can be attributed to diﬀerent factors. First, commuters are not aﬀected by this increase
in parking fees, as employers are assumed to provide parking for their employees. Second,
travelers who drive through the city without parking are not aﬀected either. Third, we
have assumed the parking fees to be constant throughout the day. Eﬃciency is lost because
parking fees are not diﬀerentiated by time. Further simulations have shown that when
parking fees can be diﬀerentiated between peak and oﬀ-peak periods, the welfare eﬀect of
an increase in parking fees becomes positive.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have compared the eﬀects and welfare changes of alternative urban trans-
port policies. We have built a stochastic, multimodal, multi-class, multi-period model,
which allows for endogenous congestion and total demand elasticity. Pure as well as mixed
modes of transport are considered, and diﬀerent government perspectives are compared.
For the conurbation of Leuven, we ﬁnd that Leuven would proﬁt from a introduction of
road pricing in the city center. Another ﬁnding is that the expansion of public transit in
Leuven implies a welfare increase from the point of view of the city authority, while it is
welfare decreasing from the perspective of society. As a result we conclude that caution is
recommended for when transit agencies are state-owned as city authorities can lobby for
projects which are welfare decreasing from societal point of view.
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How can transportation be organized as eﬃciently as possible? From diﬀerent angles,
transport economists contribute to answering this question by studying various aspects of
eﬃciency in the context of transportation. This PhD-thesis within the ﬁeld of transporta-
tion economics also does its part by focusing on the eﬃcient use of traﬃc lights and on the
implementation of eﬃcient transportation policies.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we studied the eﬀects of a priority rule, traﬃc lights, and a
toll on an intersection of two routes connecting one O-D pair. We derived the intersection
regulation that minimizes total travel cost, taking into account Wardrop's principles and
the delay at the intersection.
We have four major results. First, if the intersection is regulated by a priority rule, the
optimal policy is generally to block one of the two routes. Second, if the intersection is
regulated by traﬃc lights, and only one route is congestible, the optimal policy is again to
block one route. However, the addition of a toll allows for an optimal alternating signal
setting. Third, if the intersection is regulated by traﬃc lights, the optimal alternating sig-
nal setting is always independent of the elasticity of demand. Finally, if only one route is
subject to congestion, the superiority of a regulation by traﬃc lights over a priority rule
becomes more likely the lower the reaction time of the drivers, and the higher the cycle
time.
These results are important for three reasons. First, the counter-intuitive nature of these
results conﬁrms the importance of a good understanding of the causal mechanisms that
govern the optimal regulation. Second, these insights allow to solve larger networks more
eﬃciently as well as more eﬀectively. More eﬃcient, because the increased insight in the
location of the optimal solution allows for a reduction in computation time. More eﬀective,
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because local optima can be detected more easily. Finally, the obtained results can be ap-
plied in practice. Our results can be useful in diﬀerent contexts. We primarly think about
two parallel roads (e.g. a road through an urban area and a parallel road bypassing the
city) or two parallel modes (e.g. a train and a road connecting two cities).
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we compared two diﬀerent regulations for an intersection of two
routes connecting one O-D pair where only one route is subject to congestion. In particular,
we contrasted traﬃc-responsive control with anticipatory control.
We have shown that (1) traﬃc responsive signal control can only perform just as well or
worse than anticipatory signal control and that (2) the expected performance of traﬃc re-
sponsive signal control is worse than the performance of anticipatory signal control. The
game theoretic perspective taken in this paper furthermore suggests that these results can
also be extended to larger instances.
These results have important implications for policy. The counter-intuitiveness of these
results indicates that great attention needs to be given to the accuracy of the appraisal of
signal control investments. Since both the costs of road transportation infrastructure and
user costs are large, policy should be based on careful analysis rather than on intuition
alone. The allocation of public money to the intuitively superior traﬃc-responsive signal
control, may actually make society worse oﬀ as the money could be more eﬃciently spent on
anticipatory signal control. This paper furthermore intends to raise awareness that policies
based on intuition alone can have unintended consequences in the hope that these can be
recognized and avoided.
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, we studied the extent to which traﬃc lights can provide an
alternative to road pricing in a simple network with two routes connecting one O-D pair.
We have compared the performance of traﬃc lights and tolls for two diﬀerent networks. For
the network with two parallel routes, we have modeled both the signal setting procedure
and the toll setting procedure as a Stackelberg game. We ﬁnd that tolls generally perform
better than traﬃc lights.
For the network in which traﬃc lights regulate the intersection of two routes connecting one
OD pair, we have used a Stackelberg approach as well as an inverse Stackelberg approach.
We have derived the conditions a signal setting has to satisfy to be able to obtain the same
results as when both traﬃc lights and a toll can be used to optimize the network. With
a numerical example, this paper showed that it is possible to ﬁnd a ﬂow-dependent signal
setting that can render road pricing redundant.
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, we have compared the eﬀects and welfare changes of alternative
urban transport policies. We have built a stochastic, multimodal, multi-class, multi-period
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model, which allows for endogenous congestion and total demand elasticity. Pure as well as
mixed modes of transport are considered, and diﬀerent government perspectives are com-
pared. For the conurbation of Leuven, we ﬁnd that Leuven would proﬁt from a introduction
of road pricing in the city center. Another ﬁnding is that the expansion of public transit
in Leuven implies a welfare increase from the point of view of the city authority, while it
is welfare decreasing from the perspective of society. As a result we conclude that caution
is recommended for when transit agencies are state-owned as city authorities can lobby for
projects which are welfare decreasing from societal point of view.
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Appendix A
Derivation of τ* and r* and second
order conditions for X1 > 0, X2 > 0
(only 1 route liable to congestion)
min
X1,X2,r,τ
(a1X1 + ω + φ1 + T1 (c, r) + τ)X1 + (ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r))X2 − τX1 (A.1)
s.t.
X1 +X2 = N (A.2)
a1X1 + ω + φ1 + T1 (c, r) + τ = ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r) (A.3)
0 < r < c (A.4)
X1 > 0 (A.5)
X2 > 0 (A.6)
τ > 0 (A.7)
This can be rewritten as follows:
min
r,τ
(ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r))N − τ
(
φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)− τ
a1
)
(A.8)
φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)− τ > 0 (A.9)
a1N − φ2 + φ1 − T2 (c, r) + T1 (c, r) + τ > 0 (A.10)
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0 < r < c (A.11)
−τ < 0 (A.12)
L (r, τ) = (−ω − φ2 − T2 (c, r))N + τ
(
T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r) + φ2 − φ1 − τ
a1
)
(A.13)
−λ1 (−T2 (c, r) + T1 (c, r) + φ1 − φ2 + τ) (A.14)
−λ2 (−τ + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)− a1N + φ2 − φ1) (A.15)
−λ3 (r − c)− λ4 (−r)− λ5 (−τ) (A.16)
Derivation to τ
∂L
∂τ
=
(
T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r) + φ2 − φ1 − τ
a1
)
− τ
a1
− λ1 + λ2 + λ5 = 0 (A.17)
λ1 = 0, φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r) > τ, (A.18)
λ1 (−T2 (c, r) + T1 (c, r) + φ1 − φ2 + τ) = 0 (A.19)
λ2 = 0, a1N − φ2 + φ1 − T2 (c, r) + T1 (c, r) > −τ, (A.20)
λ2 (−τ + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)− a1N + φ2 − φ1) = 0 (A.21)
λ5 = 0, −τ < 0, (A.22)
λ5 (−τ) = 0 (A.23)
For 0 < r < c:
τ =
φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)
2
(A.24)
Derivation to r
∂L
∂r
= −∂T2 (c, r)
∂r
N +
(
τ
a1
+ λ1 − λ2
)(
∂T2 (c, r)
∂r
− ∂T1 (c, r)
∂r
)
− λ3 + λ4 = 0 (A.25)
λ1 = 0, −T2 (c, r) + T1 (c, r) < −τ + φ2 − φ1, (A.26)
λ1 (−T2 (c, r) + T1 (c, r) + φ1 − φ2 + τ) = 0 (A.27)
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λ2 = 0, T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r) < τ + a1N − φ2 + φ1, (A.28)
λ2 (−τ + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)− a1N + φ2 − φ1) = 0 (A.29)
λ3 = 0, r < c, λ3 (r − c) = 0 (A.30)
λ4 = 0, −r < 0, λ4 (−r) = 0 (A.31)
The second order conditions are given by the following equations:
∂2L
∂r2
= −N
c
< 0 (A.32)
∂2L
∂τ2
= − 2
a1
< 0 (A.33)
∂2L
∂rτ
=
1
a1
(A.34)
It is clear that if 2a1N ≥ c, then 2a1 Nc − 1a21 ≥ 0 and so the optimal (τ , r) is a minimum.
However, if N < c2a1 the optimal (τ , r) is a saddle point. In this case, the lowest point will
be near the corner.
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Derivation of r* for X1 > 0, X2 > 0
(both routes liable to congestion)
min
X1,X2,r
(a1X1 + ω + φ1 + T1 (c, r))X1 + (a2X2 + ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r))X2 (B.1)
s.t.
X1 +X2 = N (B.2)
a1X1 + ω + φ1 + T1 (c, r) = a2X2 + ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r) (B.3)
0 < r < c (B.4)
X1 > 0 (B.5)
X2 > 0 (B.6)
This can be written as follows:
min
r
(
a1
(
a2N + φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)
a1 + a2
)
+ ω + φ1 + T1 (c, r)
)
N (B.7)
s.t.
a2N + φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r) > 0 (B.8)
a1N − φ2 + φ1 − T2 (c, r) + T1 (c, r) > 0 (B.9)
0 < r < c (B.10)
The corresponding Lagragian is given by:
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L =
(
−a1
(
a2N + φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)
a1 + a2
)
− ω − φ1 − T1 (c, r)
)
N (B.11)
−λ1 (−a2N − φ2 + φ1 − T2 (c, r) + T1 (c, r)) (B.12)
−λ2 (−a1N + φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)) (B.13)
−λ3 (r − c)− λ4 (−r) (B.14)
The FOC are as follows:
∂L
∂r
= − a1N
a1 + a2
(
∂T2 (c, r)
∂r
− ∂T1 (c, r)
∂r
)
− ∂T1 (c, r)
∂r
N (B.15)
−λ1
(
−∂T2 (c, r)
∂r
+
∂T1 (c, r)
∂r
)
− λ2
(
∂T2 (c, r)
∂r
− ∂T1 (c, r)
∂r
)
(B.16)
−λ3 + λ4 = 0 (B.17)
−a2N − φ2 + φ1 − T2 (c, r) + T1 (c, r) < 0, λ1 = 0, (B.18)
λ1 (−a2N − φ2 + φ1 − T2 (c, r) + T1 (c, r)) = 0 (B.19)
−a1N + φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r) < 0, λ2 = 0, (B.20)
λ2 (−a1N + φ2 − φ1 + T2 (c, r)− T1 (c, r)) = 0 (B.21)
r < c, λ3 = 0, λ3 (r − c) = 0 (B.22)
−r < 0, λ4 = 0, λ4 (−r) = 0 (B.23)
If the optimal r is inserted in constraints (B.8) and (B.9), then it becomes clear that
the interior solution is only feasible if:
2 (a1 + a2) (a2N + φ2 − φ1) > a1c− a2c (B.24)
and
2 (a1 + a2) (a2N − φ2 + φ1) > a2c− a1c (B.25)
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Derivation of the aggregate AC
We will assume the properties of the routes connecting CB to be the same as those con-
necting AC.
AC1ac = a1X1ac + ω + φ1 + T1 (c, r)
AC2ac = a2X2ac + ω + φ2 + T2 (c, r)
AC1cb = a1X1cb + ω + φ1
AC2cb = a2X2ac + ω + φ2
demand = δ − pi (X1 +X2)
XT = X1cb +X2cb = X1ac +X2ac
X1ac =
ACac − ω − φ1 − T1 (c, r)
a1
(C.1)
X2ac =
ACac − ω − φ2 − T2 (c, r)
a2
(C.2)
a1a2XTac = (a1 + a2)ACac − (a1 + a2)ω − a1(φ2 + T2 (c, r))− a2(φ1 + T1 (c, r)) (C.3)
ACac =
a1a2XTac
a1 + a2
+ ω +
a1
a1 + a2
(φ2 + T2 (c, r)) +
a2
a1 + a2
(φ1 + T1 (c, r)) (C.4)
ACcb =
a1a2XTcb
a1 + a2
+ ω +
a1
a1 + a2
(φ2) +
a2
a1 + a2
(φ1) (C.5)
ACcb+ACac =
2a1a2XT
a1 + a2
+ω+
2a1
a1 + a2
(φ2)+
2a2
a1 + a2
(φ1)+
a1
a1 + a2
(T2 (c, r))+
a2
a1 + a2
(T1 (c, r))
(C.6)
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Figure C.1: The aggregate cost
In Figure C.1 the aggregated cost curve is shown. The kink in the cost curve is due
to the change from using only one route, to using both routes.
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Appendix D
Derivation of the total cost for an
intersection regulated by a priority
rule (both routes liable to congestion)
min
X1,X2
(a1X1 + ω + φ1)X1 +
(
a2X2 + ω + φ2 +
v2X1
2
)
X2 (D.1)
s.t.
X1 +X2 = N (D.2)
a1X1 + ω + φ1 = a2X2 + ω + φ2 +
v2X1
2
(D.3)
X1 > 0 (D.4)
X2 > 0 (D.5)
The total cost at the interior solution equals:
(a1X
e
1 + ω + φ1)N (D.6)
The total cost at the corner solution (X1 = N) equals:
(a1N + ω + φ1)N (D.7)
The total cost at the corner solution (X2 = N) equals:
(a2N + ω + φ2)N (D.8)
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D.1. Derivation of r* when demand is elastic (both routes liable to congestion)
D.1 Derivation of r* when demand is elastic (both routes li-
able to congestion)
To ﬁnd r*, the derivative of the following equation to r is taken. After which it is checked
if r* satisﬁes the constraints.
The total cost equals:
δXeT −
pi
2
(XeT )
2− a1a2
a1 + a2
(XeT )
2−2ωXeT −
2(a1φ2 + a2φ1)
a1 + a2
XeT −
a1T2 (c, r) + a2T1 (c, r))
a1 + a2
XeT
(D.9)
The derivation to r gives us the following condition:
∂XeT
∂r
XeT
(
pi
2
+
a1a2
a1 + a2
)
= 0 (D.10)
The signal setting for which XeT = 0, would imply that no driver would make the trip
and the welfare would be equal to zero. In this case, the road could just as well be closed
oﬀ. The signal setting for which
∂XeT
∂r = 0 equals:
a2c
a1 + a2
(D.11)
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Appendix E
Waiting time computation for one
route
Figure E.1: Composition of the cycle time
It is assumed that traﬃc conditions are undersaturated. Then the average waiting
time for drivers arriving when the traﬃc light is red is equal to r2 . Given that the chance
thar drivers arrive when it is red is rc , the average waiting time for all drivers equals:
r2
2c
(E.1)
and the waiting time for Route 1 (with c-r red) equals:
(c− r)2
2c
(E.2)
In cases where the intersection is regulated by a priority rule, the red time is replaced
by v (v seconds before a car on the main road passes the intersection, cars on the minor
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road already wait until the car on the main road has passed the intersection), and the cycle
time is replaced by the interarrival time of cars on the main road ( 1X1 ). The waiting time
for cars on the minor road then equals:
v2X1
2
(E.3)
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Appendix F
Area AIFE > area ABCD
Area AIFE- area CDEF >0(
φ2 − φ1 − c2
)2
4a1
+
(
φ2 − φ1 + r ∗ − c2
)
r∗
2a1
+
r∗2
4a1
−N r∗
2
2c
> 0 (F.1)
(
φ2 − φ1 − c2
)2
2a1
> 0 (F.2)
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Appendix G
Comparison of the interior solution
and the corner solutions
TC(interior*) < TC(X2=N)(
(φ1 − φ2 + c2)2
2 (−2a1N + c) + ω + φ2
)
N < (ω + φ2)N (G.1)
(φ1 − φ2 + c2)2
2 (−2a1N + c) < 0 (G.2)
As the left hand side is negative, this is always satisﬁed.
TC(interior*)< TC(X1=N)((
φ1 − φ2 + c2)2
2 (−2a1N + c) + ω + φ2
)
N < (a1N + ω + φ1)N (G.3)
(
φ1 − φ2 + c2)2
2 (−2a1N + c) + φ2 − φ1 < a1N (G.4)
As 2aN − c2 + φ1 > φ2 for an interior optimum, this is always satisﬁed.
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Appendix H
One instrument can account for the
ineﬃciency in a parallel network with
inelastic demand
min
τ1,X1,X2,τ2
(a1X1 + f1 + τ1)X1 + (a2X2 + f2 + τ2)X2 − τ1X1 − τ2X2 (H.1)
s.t.
a1X1 + f1 + τ1 = a2X2 + f2 + τ2 (H.2)
X1 +X2 = N (H.3)
X1 > 0 (H.4)
X2 > 0 (H.5)
τ1 > 0 (H.6)
τ2 > 0 (H.7)
The optimal τ2 is given by
τ2 = τ1 +
f1 − f2
2
(H.8)
The optimal τ1 equals
τ1 = τ2 +
f2 − f1
2
(H.9)
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It is clear that only the diﬀerence between τ1 and τ2 is uniquely determined.
Remark that in equation (H.10), τ1 − τ2 can be replaced by τ .
(a1(
a2N + f2 − f1 − τ
a+a2
) + f1 + τ)N − τ(a2N + f2 − f1 − τ
a+a2
) (H.10)
The optimal τ then equals
τ =
f2 − f1
2
(H.11)
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Appendix I
Computation of the total cost for a
network without intersection with
road pricing
Figure I.1: Road pricing to inﬂuence route choice
Suppose that in the network in Figure I.1 a toll is levied on Route 1. Then all drivers
will take Route 1 in equilibrium if f2 > a1N + f1 + τ . If however, f1 + τ > a2N + f2
then all drivers will take Route 2 in equilibrium. Finally, if f2 ≤ a1N + f1 + τ and
f1 + τ ≤ a2N + f2, then the drivers will use both routes in equilibrium. When both routes
are used in equilibrium, the average cost of the two routes has to be equal.
f1 + a1X1 + τ = a2X2 + f2 (I.1)
Substituting this constraint in the total cost function, and using X1 + X2 = N , the
total cost takes the following form:
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(
f1 +
a1(a2N + f2 − f1)
a1 + a2
) +
a2τ
a1 + a2
)
N − τ(a2N + f2 − f1 − τ
a1 + a2
) (I.2)
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Appendix J
Computation of the total cost for a
network without intersection with
traﬃc lights
Figure J.1: A traﬃc light to inﬂuence route choice
Consider the network in Figure J.1. All drivers will take Route 1 in the equilibrium if
f2 > a1N + f1 + T1. If, however, f1 + T1 > a2N + f2 then all drivers will take Route 2 in
the equilibrium. Finally, if f2 ≤ a1N + f1 + T1 and f1 + T1 ≤ a2N + f2, then the drivers
will use both routes in the equilibrium. If all drivers take Route 1, then the total cost is
the sum of the minimal time cost, the congestion cost and the traﬃc light waiting cost for
every driver. In this case, the total cost can be minimized by setting the traﬃc light always
to green. The total cost then equals (a1N + f1)N . On Route 2 there is no traﬃc light, so
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the average cost will be the sum of the minimal time cost and the congestion cost. If all
drivers take Route 2 in equilibrium, the total cost will thus be (f2 + a2N)N . When both
routes are used in equilibrium, the average cost of both routes has to be equal:
f1 + a1X1 + T1 = a2X2 + f2 (J.1)
Substituting the result of this equation together with X1 + X2 = N in the total cost
(f1 + a1X1 + T1 (c, r))X1 + (f2 + a2X2)X2, we obtain:(
f1 +
a1(a2N + f2 − f1)
a1 + a2
) +
a2T1
a1 + a2
)
N (J.2)
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Appendix K
Optimization of the network with
road pricing and traﬃc lights
min
r,X1,X2,τ
(f1 + a1X1 + T1 (c, r2) + τ)X1 + (f2 + a2X2 + T2 (c, r2))X2 − τX1 (K.1)
s.t.
f1 + a1X1 + T1 (c, r2) + τ = f2 + a2X2 + T2 (c, r2) (K.2)
X1 +X2 = N (K.3)
X1 > 0 (K.4)
X2 > 0 (K.5)
r2 > 0 (K.6)
r2 < c (K.7)
The associated Langragian is given by:
L = (f1 + a1X1 + T1 + τ)X1+(f2 + a2X2 + T2)X2−τX1+λ1(N−X1−X2)+λ2(f2−f1−a1X1−T1+T2+a2X2)
(K.8)
The FOC are the following:
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dL
dX1
= a1X1 + f1 + a1X1 + T1 (c, r2)− λ1 − λ2a1 = 0 (K.9)
dL
dX2
= a2X2 + f2 + a2X2 + T2 (c, r2)− λ1 − λ2a2 = 0 (K.10)
dL
dλ1
= N −X1 −X2 = 0 (K.11)
dL
dλ2
= f2 + a2X2 + T2 (c, r)− f1 − a1X1 − T1 (c, r)− τ = 0 (K.12)
dL
dτ
= −λ2 = 0 (K.13)
dL
dr2
=
dT1 (c, r2)
dr2
X1 +
dT2 (c, r2)
dr2
X2 + λ2
(
dT2 (c, r2)
dr2
− dT1 (c, r2)
dr2
)
= 0 (K.14)
Combining λ2 = 0 and the ﬁrst order conditions for X1 and X2, we ﬁnd that MC1 =MC2
in the optimum.
If we combine λ2 = 0, the ﬁrst order conditions for X1 and X2 and the ﬁrst order condition
for λ2, we obtain the optimal toll:
τ = a1X1 − a2X2 (K.15)
Finally, if we combine λ2 = 0 and the ﬁrst order condition for r2, we ﬁnd that the optimal
signal setting is determined by the following equation:
dT1 (c, r2)
dr2
X1 = −dT2 (c, r2)
dr2
X2 (K.16)
The optimal variables are then:
τ =
(
f2 − f1 − c2
)
(a1 + a2)N + a2Nc
2 (a1 + a2)N − c (K.17)
r =
(
f2 − f1 − c2 + 2a2N
)
c
2 (a1 + a2)N − c (K.18)
Xe1 =
(
f2 − f1 − c2 + 2a2N
)
N
2 (a1 + a2)N − c (K.19)
And the minimum cost equals:
TCint =
N(c2 + 4c(f1 − f2)− 4(4a2Nf1 − (f1 − f2)2 + 4a1N(a2N + f2)
8(c− 2(a1 + a2)N) (K.20)
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Appendix L
Implications of
AC2(X
∗
2 , r
∗
2) > AC1(X
∗
1 , r
∗
2) and
AC2(X
∗
2 , r
∗
2) < AC1(X
∗
1 , r
∗
2)
If AC2(X∗2 , r∗2) > AC1(X∗1 , r∗2), then equation (4.25) implies equation (4.26) for allX1 > X∗1 .
Indeed, if there exists a rh2 for which AC1(X
∗
1 , r
h
2 ) ≥ AC2(X∗2 , r∗2) and AC2(X∗2 , r∗2) >
AC1(X
∗
1 , r
∗
2), then AC1(X
∗
1 , r
h
2 ) > AC1(X
∗
2 , r
∗
2), which implies that r
h
2 < r
∗. As a conse-
quence, AC2(X∗1 , rh2 ) < AC2(X∗2 , r∗2), and AC1(X∗1 , rh2 ) > AC2(X∗1 , rh2 ).
If, on the other hand, AC2(X∗2 , r∗2) < AC1(X∗1 , r∗2), then equation (4.26) implies equa-
tion (4.25).
From Figure L.1 is clear that for r∗2 equation (4.23) and equation (4.24) are satisﬁed.
If rh2 increases, then the average cost curve of Route 1 shifts down (AC
′
1 in Figure L.1) and
the average cost curve of Route 2 shifts up (AC ′2 in Figure L.1). Figure L.1 shows that
there exists a rh2 for which equation (4.24) is violated while equation (4.23) is still satisﬁed.
For rh2 < r
∗
2, both equations (4.23) and (4.24) are always satisﬁed.
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Figure L.1: If AC∗2 < AC
∗
1 , then equation (4.26) implies equation (4.25).
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Appendix M
Data
M.0.1 Quantities
Road traﬃc (cars) between 7h-8h in 2009:
Table M.1: Flow (number of cars/h)
work school other
O→ C 2729.1 2671.63 167.83
O→ SEC 1727.77 573.33 66.84
C→ SEC 1173.75 1465.88 146.09
PER→ C 1794.2 2641.66 254.32
C→ C 1730.05 3700.9 649.59
Source: Computations on basis of data from Verkeerscentrum Vlaanderen
This data needs to be converted into passengers per OD pair and per user class for
each period. The data we need is represented in the following tables:
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Table M.2: O→ C (number of passengers in %)
work school other
bike 9.89 13.29 4.7
bus/bike 0.33 1.06 0.39
bus/bus 4.87 15.51 5.74
bus/pedestrian 3.78 12.02 4.44
car/parking center 80.04 54.63 79.44
car/parking periphery 0 2.88 4.18
train/bike 0.15 0.58 0.07
train/bus 0.18 0.71 0.09
train/pedestrian 1.70 6.61 0.80
Source: computations on the basis of Janssens et al. (2012).
Table M.3: O→ SEC (number of passengers in %)
work school other
bike 9.89 13.29 4.7
bus/bike 0.41 1.30 0.48
bus/bus 4.87 15.51 5.74
car 80.04 57.5 83.62
train/bike 1.19 4.63 0.56
train/bus 1.19 4.63 0.56
Source: computations on the basis of Janssens et al. (2012).
Table M.4: C→ SEC (number of passengers in %)
work school other
bike 40.08 39 16.12
bus 2.21 15.6 3.41
car 53.85 40 72.52
pedestrian 0 1.39 6.4
Source: computations on the basis of Janssens et al. (2012).
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Table M.5: PER→ C (number of passengers in %)
work school other
bike 40.08 33.43 16.12
bus 2.21 18 3.41
car/center 51.16 42.75 68.89
car/periphery 2.69 2.25 3.63
pedestrian 0 1.39 6.4
Source: computations on the basis of Janssens et al. (2012).
Table M.6: C→ C (number of passengers in %)
work school other
bike 39.83 32.20 17.44
bus 2.34 5.97 0.34
car 31.14 27.18 32.45
pedestrian 25.54 31.53 49
Source: computations on the basis of Janssens et al. (2012).
Table M.7: Peak/oﬀ-peak ratio
work* other* school**
peak 0.7 0.47 0.6
oﬀ-peak 0.3 0.53 0.4
*Source: Van Der Loo and Proost (2010)
**Source: author's own estimate
Table M.8: Duration peak/oﬀ-peak (h)
peak oﬀ-peak
6 18
Table M.9: Occupancy
car
peak 1.58
oﬀ-peak 1.68
Source: Delhaye et al. (2010)
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M.0.2 Generalized prices
To calculate the time cost, we need the following data:
Table M.10: Observed speed (km/h)
observed speed car/bus
outside∗ 60
in PER∗ 60
in city center∗∗ 20
on ringroad∗∗ 40
between SEC and city center∗∗ 50
∗Source: Verkeerscentrum (2014)
∗∗Source: author's own estimate
Table M.11: Average distance of trips (km)
Average distance of trips between:
O-C C-C PER-C C-SEC O-SEC
11 1 3 3.5 14.5
Table M.12: Stop-time bus (hours/km)
center outside SEC
0.02 0.0067 0.0017
Source: authors' calculations based on timetables of De Lijn
Table M.13: Value of time (euro/h)
work school other
car 7.71 6.47 6.47
bus/tram/metro 5.48 4.59 4.59
pedestrian/bike 6.71 5.62 5.62
Source: Hertveldt et al. (2009)
The frequencies of bus and tram are determined assuming that the transit agency only
increases frequency when all vehicles are full.
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Table M.14: Free ﬂow speed (km/h)
free ﬂow speed car/bus
outside 90
in PER 90
in city center 30
on ringroad 50
between SEC and city center 60
Table M.15: Free ﬂow speed (km/h)
pedestrian∗ bike∗∗ train∗∗∗ tram
free ﬂow speed 3.6 18 50 30±/50±±
∗Source: Basso and Silva (2014)
∗∗Source:van der Steenhoven and Borgman (2009)
∗∗∗Source: timetables NMBS
±Speed in center
±±Speed between SEC and center
Table M.16: Capacity (number of passengers)
bus*
70 - 100
*Source: author's own estimate
Table M.17: Access time (h)
train bus
0.15 0.1-0.14
Source: author's own estimate
Table M.18: Frequency train (vehicles/h)
frequency train
peak 6.84
oﬀ-peak 3
Source: author's computation based on the timetables of NMBS
M.0.3 Welfare
The operation, maintenance and investment costs are listed in Table M.19
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Table M.19: Cost
tram bus
cost per vehiclekm (euro) 3.78 2.77
cost per vehiclehour (euro) 111.14 82.83
cost per routekm (euro) 264.88 /
cost per vehicle (euro) / 99.1
Source: Van Oppens (2013)
The external congestion cost is included in the generalised cost. The other external
costs are the environmental, noise and accident costs in Table 4.15
Table M.20: Marginal external cost (euro)
bus∗ car∗ tram∗∗
marginal external cost 0.233 0.022 0.57
∗Source: Delhaye et al. (2010)
∗∗Source: Delhaye et al. (2010)/De Lijn
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